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Owing to the recent transitions in the Czech Republic, the Czech military must 
satisfy a large set of new requirements. One way the military intelligence can become 
more effective and can conserve resources is by increasing the efficiency of open-source 
intelligence (OSINT), which plays an important part in intelligence gathering in the age 
of information. When using OSINT effectively, the military intelligence can elevate its 
responsiveness to different types of crises and can also properly allocate its limited 
resources into areas, in which covert collection is unavoidable. 
This thesis combines modern knowledge-management theory with current issues 
in military intelligence, creating a base for designing a future OSINT system in the Czech 
military. First, the thesis introduces recent US research in knowledge management and 
examines the current intelligence issues. Then the thesis examines the Czech military 
intelligence environment in the framework of the national security and defense policy and 
also analyzes the actual use of OSINT in the Military Intelligence Service, following the 
four stages of the knowledge system and process design. Finally, the thesis outlines the 
main aspects of the future OSINT knowledge-management system and recommends 
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I. THESIS SUBJECT, OBJECTIVES, AND RESEARCH 
APPROACH  
Chapter one discusses the purpose and objectives of this thesis. It presents brief 
background information and the research questions. The chapter also provides an 





The Czech military intelligence needs to evolve into a different type of service—
for several reasons. Recent political, economical, and social transitions have imposed 
different security threats on the Czech Republic. Moreover, accession to NATO has 
brought a large set of requirements that military intelligence must meet. In addition, the 
information revolution presents permanent challenges for intelligence collection and 
processing. 
Indeed, much has already changed since the peaceful revolution in 1989. 
However, many of the military intelligence procedures and assets remain frozen in an 
old-fashioned mindset. The economical and political disposition of the Czech 
government during the mid-1990's left the top military management with many 
unanswered questions. Furthermore, frequent ad hoc adjustments in both organizational 
and procedural arrangements have not significantly helped the military intelligence to 
move ahead. 
It is obvious that the Czech Republic does not have, and will unlikely ever have, 
the collection and processing capabilities of the major powers, such as the USA, Canada, 
and the UK. The Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, limited by budget constraints and 
by the sociopolitical situation inside the country, cannot simply make a huge leap toward 
state-of-the-art military technologies. However, if the top management of military 
intelligence really wants to improve the service, a systematic and scientific approach is 
necessary in order to achieve positive results.  
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One way to increase intelligence effectiveness and conserve resources is to 
employ open-source intelligence (OSINT) efficiently. Military intelligence should fully 
embrace all the advantages of OSINT, which plays an important part in intelligence 
gathering in the age of information. When using OSINT effectively, the military 
intelligence can elevate its responsiveness to different types of current crises and can also 
allow the proper allocation of its limited resources into other areas, in which covert 
collection is unavoidable. 
Although the Czech military intelligence currently uses open sources for gaining 
different kinds of information, a systematic approach to this domain has been missing and 
the use of OSINT is far from an ideal solution. However, by building upon the 
framework of knowledge management theory, a basic design of modern OSINT in the 
Czech military intelligence can be created. Such an arrangement can then be considered 





On one side, knowledge management theory and its implications represent a new 
arena for the Czech military, an arena that has not been explored yet. On the other side, 
using open sources for intelligence purposes was significant even in the pre-revolution 
information gathering. But OSINT was practically abandoned in the early 1990's and has 
not been systematically modernized since then. 
This thesis seeks to meet the following objectives: 
• To introduce recent US research in knowledge management to the Czech 
military environment. 
• To indicate contemporary problems in intelligence and to examine current 
knowledge about OSINT. 
• To inquire the military intelligence environment in the framework of the 
Czech security and defense policy, and to analyze actual use of OSINT in the 
intelligence. 
• To create a theoretical base for future design of OSINT systems and processes 
in the Czech military intelligence. 
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• To make a set of recommendations for further research and development. 
  
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
This research is focused on answering a primary question "How can the Czech 
military intelligence design its open-source intelligence?" To help answer the question, 
these subsequent secondary questions will be addressed: 
• What is knowledge, and how is it used in military intelligence processes? 
• What is open-source intelligence (OSINT), and how does it contribute to 
military intelligence? 
• What is the current status of OSINT in the Czech military intelligence? 
• How can the basic steps of knowledge system and process design be used to 
model the improved OSINT in the Czech military intelligence? 




D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The scope of this thesis includes an overview of knowledge management theory. 
Also, the thesis provides a current view of intelligence in general, and further 
concentrates on the currently most auspicious discipline, open-source intelligence 
(OSINT). The author builds on the extant security and defense policy of the Czech 
Republic and examines the present approach to using OSINT in the Czech military 
intelligence. Most of the attention is paid to the strategic level, represented by the 
Military Intelligence Service (VZS). However, other levels are included whenever 
possible in order to provide for wider context in OSINT knowledge management process 
and system design. 
The author does not look for particular information technology (IT) solutions in 
terms of hardware and software procurement. Moreover, purely IT oriented solution are 
always interim and provide only temporary competitive advantage. Neither does the 
author want to create a complete organizational model. For such a goal, specialized teams 
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and whole sets of introductory steps would be needed. So, the thesis stresses valid 
principles, taken from both the knowledge management theory and the current literature 
about intelligence, and establishes a base, upon which the further development of OSINT 
in the Czech military intelligence can be made. 
Also, the thesis does not strive to serve as an account of available open sources. 
A complete account is not possible owing to the volume and dynamics of OSINT. Even 
for one single area of interest, an extract of available open sources will be intensely 
discriminative. So the references to open sources used in this thesis will serve only for 
explanatory purposes and as examples. 
 
 
E. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
The research techniques used for this thesis include a review of topical literature 
related both to knowledge management and intelligence. Also, a review of current Czech 
military doctrines and policies is performed. Subsequently, a deductive and inductive 
approach is applied to conduct an analysis of the author's own observations related to 
OSINT in the Czech military intelligence. This analysis is also accompanied by the 
results of semi-structured interviews with Czech intelligence staff members. Finally, 
a knowledge management framework is used to create an introductory design of the 
OSINT system and processes in the Czech military intelligence. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter outlines the basic aspects of knowledge management. It also looks at 
intelligence in general and open-source intelligence (OSINT) in particular in order to 
create sufficient theoretical background for further use.  
The first part of the chapter briefly introduces the current understanding of 
knowledge, knowledge management, and the knowledge process and system design. The 
next section examines the body of knowledge about intelligence in general. The last part 
concentrates on open-source intelligence in more details. 
  
 
A. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
 
Knowledge is power. This expression has not changed much over time. But the 
importance of such power has changed, owing to the evolution of technological tools that 
can be used to manage knowledge. The recent widespread advances in computer and 
communication technologies are usually labeled as the information revolution. While the 
new technology has reached every possible corner of the business world, the military 
with its highly hierarchical structure struggles to achieve interconnectivity and 
information superiority in the future battlespace. 
 
Owens (2000) and others argue that the information revolution and advances in 
computer technology have brought unfailing possibilities for future combat. Such 
optimistic exponents believe that the advances in computing and communication are truly 
revolutionary and will change the very nature of the military. According to them, 
widespread knowledge about potential and existing adversaries—enabled by computer 
networks, advanced overhead surveillance, and real-time communication—will allow 
armies to wage better wars. In such an environment of Dominant Battlespace Knowledge 
(DBK), the military will be smaller yet stronger and more mobile, able to react on a short 
notice. Through the use of advanced information technology, the friendly forces should 
be better protected and employed more wisely while the enemy forces will be shattered—
mostly thanks to the ability to find and track all important enemy assets promptly. 
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Opposing Owens' views, O'Hanlon (2000) and others see certain disparities in the 
military assets evolution and argue that while there has been very significant progress in 
computing and communication systems, there are many other areas where the limits are 
still severe and evolution slow. Constraints will still remain significant in infantry and 
urban warfare; optical and radar penetrability of forests and buildings will probably not 
be improved radically; acoustic and other types of sensors are unlikely to increase their 
reach dramatically; and detection of chemical and biological materials will likely remain 
severely limited unless the agents are released out of their carriers. 
 
Many lessons can be learned from the recent developments in the intelligence 
community. Indeed, the Czech military intelligence should not be built on purely 
technical premises. On the other hand, proper application and systematic use of 
technological tools will help to manage knowledge effectively. 
 
1. Data, Information, and Knowledge 
 
In order to understand knowledge and knowledge management principles better, 
one must clearly distinguish knowledge from information and data. People commonly use 
"data" and "information" as synonyms while "knowledge" is more clearly viewed as the 
data or information that people retain in their minds. As the three terms are sometimes 
used interchangeably, they must be defined at the onset. 
 
Data: Data are most frequently perceived as being related to computer and 
communication technology. Few authors even bother to define the term, assuming that its 
meaning is so obvious that it does not require classification. Many misunderstandings can 
arise from failing to consider the meaning of such a basic concept.  
On the academic basis, Clarke (2001/1) provides one useful and simple definition: 
"Data are any symbol, sign or measure in a form that can be directly captured by a person 
or a machine." On the military side, the US Department of Defense (DoD), for example, 
uses this definition of data: [Data represent facts, concepts, or instructions, such as 
characters or analog quantities, to which meaning is or might be assigned. Data exist in 
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a formalized manner, suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by 
humans or by automatic means.] (JP-1.02. 1994) 
So data are understood as a set of discrete facts and events, such as text, numbers, 
signs, and so on. By itself, data have no meaning until placed in an appropriate context 
and transferred into information.   
 
Information: The term "information" also requires a proper definition. 
Dictionaries are usually too vague and different researchers often bring inconsistent 
definitions. Clarke (2001/1), for example, provides for a definition by encapsulating these 
elements: "Information is data that has value. Informational value depends upon context. 
Until it is placed in an appropriate context, data are not information, and once it ceases to 
be in that context it ceases to be information." A definition invoked in the NATO military 
intelligence only states that "Information is unprocessed data of every description that 
may be used in the production of intelligence." (AJP-2.0. 2001) One can see that these 
definitions do not agree—while the former accentuates information value that is built 
upon data, the latter merely states information serves as base for an intelligence product.  
Information should be understood as a message that possesses meaning; that is 
what distinguishes it from data, which have no significance on its own. The meaning 
need not to be the same in the minds of both the sender and receiver. Actually, it is the 
receiver's cognition what makes the data become information (Davenport and Prusak 
1998). 
 
Knowledge: The term "knowledge" is often used to refer to "a body of facts and 
principles accumulated by mankind in the course of time" (Clarke 2001/2). This is just 
one of many definitions, but it precisely expresses the necessity of human ability to build 
knowledge and also the dependence of knowledge on time. This definition also shows 
that knowledge is based upon previously gained information.  
As to the forms in which knowledge can exist, theory distinguishes two main 
categories—explicit knowledge and inferred knowledge.  
Explicit knowledge is formal, structured, and readily accessible. It can be found in 
books, manuals, instructions, on the Web, in groupware, and databases (Nonaka 1994, 
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Nissen 2001). Explicit knowledge is easier to manage and is better supported by existing 
IT tools. Optimally, an organization should aspire to capture and to use as much 
knowledge as possible in this form.  
Tacit, or inferred, knowledge is informal, unstructured, and can be accessed only 
via eduction and observation of behavior (Liebowitz 1999). Tacit knowledge refers to 
expertise contained within the minds of people (Nonaka 1994, Nissen 2001). It is hard, if 
not impossible, to transfer it to an explicit form; inferred knowledge is difficult to 
manage.  
In relation to these two categories, one should see that transfer of knowledge can 
occur either through structured media (such as documents and books) in the case of 
explicit knowledge, or by interpersonal contacts (such as conversation, training, 
apprenticeship, and so on) in the latter instance. 
 
Nissen et al. (2000) summarized work of scholars concerning the distinction 
between data, information, and knowledge according to their abundance and actionability 
[applicability, or practicability], or knowledge hierarchy is exhibited in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Knowledge Hierarchy 
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The correlation of the three layers, data, information, and knowledge is as 
follows: Data become information when the receiver adds meaning to it. Information 
becomes knowledge when it is applied, or when an action, based upon information, 
occurs. 
Knowledge lies in the "hierarchical pyramid" above information and data. 
However, most information technology (IT) employed in order to manage knowledge 
appears to target data and information rather than knowledge itself (e.g. Ruggles 1997). 
Moreover, existing IT is oriented primarily at database management systems (DBMS), 
data warehouses, data mining (DW/DM), Internet/intranets and groupware (O'Leary 
1998). Extant IT provides, at a maximum of its ability, only common, machine-dependent 
means for the management and distribution of information, not knowledge.  
 
For example, one can see that data mining applications are mostly associated with 
sophisticated data pattern matching. Databases and indexing help structure data and 
information. Groupware and search engines are mostly related to distribution of 
information. However, the actual ability to build knowledge upon such data and 
information still remains highly individualized. 
 
2. Knowledge Management and Knowledge Flow 
 
The power of knowledge has been acknowledged for hundreds of years. However, 
today it is recognized more at the enterprise level rather than at the level of successful 
individuals. Studies of prominent technology firms showed that knowledge has become 
the key economic resource and dominant source of comparative advantage in the market 
competition (Drucker 1995, and others). Such "corporate" knowledge is denoted as 
knowledge management (Davenport and Prusak 1998). Although the definitions of 
knowledge management vary (see for example Leibowitz's summary 1999), they share 
similar key points—knowledge must be systematically built and applied to fulfill 
organization objectives, enhance collaboration, support innovation, and magnify 
performance. Commonly, knowledge management means "to get the right knowledge to 
the right people at the right time to allow the right decisions." 
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Knowledge can generate innovation, and an organization can obtain a competitive 
edge through such innovation (Davenport and Prusak 1998). But, to posses the 
competitive advantage, knowledge must be not only created but also transferred and used 
throughout the whole organization. Such movement is called knowledge flow. It is 
obvious, for the military, that knowledge flow is imperative. However, the phenomenon 
of knowledge flow is not properly understood, and the benefits of theory of knowledge 
management and its application are not fully employed.  
The mechanics of knowledge flow between two nodes, or agents, in the 
organizational structure—no matter whether the nodes are people or machines—is quite 
similar to inter-computer data flow through several layers of hardware and software. The 
flow starts at the knowledge level and descends through information to data in one agent. 
The data are then transmitted via certain media (e.g. a computer network) and flow to the 
other agent. Then the flow ascends in the reverse order through information to knowledge 
(Nissen 2001). 
This notion of layered processing for knowledge flow has brought some very 
important insights:  
• In this concept, machines, such as computers, expert systems, and intelligent 
agents, and people, as individuals, in groups, or in organizations, exchange 
knowledge via layers of information and data in a similar fashion. 
• Direct transfer of knowledge or information is not possible because the 
exchange always occurs at the data level. Implicitly, if knowledge is to be 
transferred between different agents, the agents must be able to send and to 
receive data, upon which the knowledge is based.  
• To comprehend knowledge flow, one must understand the processing used by 
various agents (again, human or machine) to transform data and information 
into actionable knowledge, and vice versa. 
• The abstract and "intangible" concept of knowledge can be turned into an 
observable and measurable action—thus allow differentiating the knowledge 
of various agents based on their relative performance. 
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The primary objective of knowledge flow is "to enable the transfer of capability 
and expertise from where it resides to where it is needed—across space, time, and 
organizations as necessary." (Nissen 2001, p. 1) Studying knowledge management and 
knowledge flow in its complexity, researchers Nissen, Kamel, and Sengupta described 
the cyclical flow of knowledge in its complexity by developing the Knowledge 
Management Life Cycle (KMLC). 
 
3. Knowledge Management Life Cycle 
 
Knowledge management has been investigated for many years. Different authors 
were describing knowledge and knowledge management, mostly concentrating on how 
knowledge is captured and shared. A comprehensive view was missing until Nissen et al. 
(2000) presented a life cycle associated with knowledge management. Their 
amalgamated model of KMLC is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Knowledge Management Life Cycle 
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As exhibited in the figure, the KMLC is divided into six phases and two classes: 
Creation of knowledge occurs primarily in the minds of individuals. This creation 
encompasses the discovery and the development of new knowledge (Gartner Group 
1998). Such knowledge is tacit, unstructured and external to the organization (Nonaka 
1994). In the second phase, which definitely pertains to the organization, knowledge is 
organized. It is mapped, or bundled, so that the organization can recognize it. Then, in the 
phase of formalization, such knowledge is to be transposed from its tacit to its explicit 
form. Now, knowledge is structured and internal to the organization. Once formalized, 
knowledge is distributed throughout the organization in order to be shared among its 
members. This phase, heavily supported by existing IT tools, is currently the most 
emphasized phase. Knowledge, after that, can be applied, or used for problem solving or 
for decision-making processes. Finally, knowledge can further evolve, meaning that it can 
be refined and continually developed. Moreover, the evolution of knowledge can lead to 
the creation of new knowledge, thus to the generation of a new KMLC. 
When comparing the six phases of the KMLC, Nissen et al. noted that extant 
systems and practices support the process of knowledge management unevenly. 
Especially at the organizational level, they mostly support knowledge organization, 
formalization, and distribution, i.e. the phases grouped in Class I. This class is inherently 
supportive to people in the organization because it supports people in the enterprise, 
whom in turn apply, evolve and create knowledge in the organization. Class I systems are 
known as localized management systems, represented by tools such as knowledge maps, 
"yellow pages," distributed lessons learned, and others. Obversely, the phases from 
Class II are not well supported by existing IT. They are innately performative in nature 
because they perform knowledge-management activities, either in combination with or 
instead of people in the organization. 
 
Researchers (e.g. Nissen et al 2000) have shown that the knowledge flow has not 
been fully explored yet, especially in terms of integrating the knowledge process design 
with the knowledge system design. Yet they concluded that the current set of 
methodologies used in reengineering, expert systems, and information systems provide 
capabilities to design and develop IT, which is necessary for knowledge management 
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systems and processes. Furthermore, the researchers stressed that no single methodology 
is sufficient to develop all knowledge management systems and processes; a multiple 
developmental approach is essential. Such approach is represented by the knowledge 
system and process design. 
 
4. Knowledge System and Process Design 
 
As IT has become more and more present in our daily lives many enterprises and 
governmental organizations view it as a magic tool that could improve performance 
dramatically. Indeed, computer networks can create an infrastructure requisite for 
knowledge exchange, but reality proved many times that a simple insertion of IT into 
existing processes does not provide a warranty for the desired improvement. As noted by 
Weber (1993), IT provides only a temporary competitive advantage; it is just "self-
canceling technological advantage." Contrary to material assets knowledge can grant 
sustainable advantage because it generates increasing returns—knowledge assets increase 
with use (Davenport and Prusak 1998). 
 
Nissen and other researchers have revealed that information technology must be 
integrated with the design of the process it supports—including the organization, people, 
procedures, organizational culture, and so on. They identified two contextual factors that 
define and limit knowledge management systems design: the organization, and the nature 
of knowledge underlying the task (Nissen et al. 2000).  
 
When considering the first contextual factor, an organization, attention should be 
paid to these aspects: 
• Not everything that occurs is recorded: An organization has memory systems 
that maintain the lessons learned from experience (Levitt and March 1988). 
The knowledge resident in an organization’s memory establishes a mechanism 
for conserving its history, routines and the lessons learned over time. As 
outlined, these memory elements can be recorded in many ways, formally as 
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well as informally. However, no organization can currently record all of the 
existing memory elements. 
• Essential aspects of knowledge reside in the informal state: Knowledge 
captured via informal mechanisms is often richer and more important than 
what is stored formally. So the key to building useful knowledge management 
systems lies in solutions that can capture the essence of informal knowledge in 
a shape that can be preserved. Such knowledge, once lost, cannot be re-
created easily (Hutchins 1991). When, for example, a member separates from 
the organization, the potential for loss of knowledge is ample, especially in 
cases when locating existing knowledge in time and transferring it to where it 
is essential is troublesome.  
• The structure of the organization significantly influences the practice of 
knowledge creation, storage, and dissemination: Conventional organization 
structures rely more on informal networks and communities, and have well-
developed channels and norms for communication. Modified organizational 
forms enabled by information technology, such as virtual and networked 
organizations, are typically ad hoc in nature and must form such channels 
first. Moreover, maintaining continuity is difficult, and the history of relevant 
organizational knowledge is not easily available. 
• Retention and updating of knowledge is mostly an upstream activity while the 
benefits from its dissemination and use go downstream: (Davenport and 
Prusak 1998, Grudin 1996) This contraposition creates specific problems. The 
decision is often made on the basis of managerial factors, such as cost and 
schedule. Because capture of knowledge can add to the cost and cause time 
delays, high proportions of projects are terminated before they are completed. 
Also, the benefits of the knowledge are usually accrued in the latest stages of 
the project and many times by different people. Thus focusing only to 
technical aspects of knowledge management applications is insufficient. Such 
systems can only prosper if appropriate incentives for the retention and 
updating of knowledge are provided. 
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The nature of knowledge underlying the task, the second contextual factor, 
defines and limits knowledge management systems design in the following ways: 
• Hierarchical practices, such as manuals and job descriptions, frequently used 
to organize the processes are usually inadequate for complex problems: That 
is because the effort involved in acquiring knowledge required to perform 
a complex task effectively is not negligible (Lave 1988, Lave and Wenger 
1990), and because the knowledge acquired and represented in the canonical 
methods can become obsolete with changes in the task-related technology 
(Suchman 1987). 
• The actual approach to complex problems solving often departs from the 
prescriptive methods: Individuals performing complex tasks may improvise, 
resorting for non-orthodox practices to overcome shortages of hierarchical 
approaches. (Zuboff 1988) These non-formulary practices can serve as 
extensions of canonical methods, compensating for the omissions and 
inadequacies of prescriptive knowledge. Such practices can also modify the 
hierarchical methods, once they seem obsolete or less effective than the 
corresponding methods used in practice. 
 
When studying the knowledge management, researchers Nissen, Kamel, and 
Sengupta focused on knowledge management from three integrating angles: 
reengineering process innovation, expert systems knowledge acquisition and 
representation, and information systems analysis and design. They coordinated these 
three perspectives into one complex design approach, which starts with the analysis and 
design of the organizational interest, continues with the knowledge capture and 
formalization, and ends with the system design and implementation. Their design process 
is referred to as the knowledge system and process design.  
According to the researchers' study, the knowledge system and process design 
should follow four stages (Nissen et al. 2000, Nissen 2001): 
(1) Process Analysis: The first stage requires understanding the objectives and 
strategies of an organization. Without understanding the process (including 
different variations) and required knowledge, there is no use to begin 
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designing the system. The aim here is to define the knowledge ensuring 
effective performance of each process of interest. Canonical practices might 
be of help but a "hands-on" approach is also needed.  
(2) Knowledge Analysis: This analysis results from the previous analysis and 
concentrates on identifying and analyzing the knowledge within an 
organization. Central to this step is identification and analysis of critical 
success factors (CSFs)—activities that must be performed effectively in order 
for the mission to be successful. CSFs are useful to identify what knowledge 
is crucial to process performance in a particular organizational setting and 
context. 
(3) Contextual Analysis: In this phase, knowledge itself should be captured, 
particularly the tacit knowledge used by specialists. Databases, intranet 
applications, and search and retrieval systems can be used to organize, to 
formalize, and to distribute the captured knowledge. "Yellow pages" and 
knowledge maps, when available, can help identify who possesses what kind 
of knowledge. Understanding the organization and the nature of knowledge is 
essential in this assessment. 
(4) Systems Analysis and Integration: In this final stage, the organization's current 
procedures and information systems are analyzed. Also, any methodologies, 
techniques, and tools that are available and are understood can be employed to 
develop a knowledge management system. Information systems required to 
automate and support knowledge work can then be effectively designed. 
 
Knowledge itself seems to be difficult to manage and is resistant to reengineering 
and process innovation (Davenport 1995). The key point is that all three "facets"—
process, knowledge, and information—should be considered together when designing 
knowledge systems and processes (Nissen et al 2000). Abrupt implementations of "IT 
solutions" into existing processes and organizations without having considered all key 
factors helps little.  
As expressed before, knowledge management is essential for an organization 
striving for a competitive advantage. Certainly knowledge management represents 
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a significant challenge in such a complicated and large "enterprise" as a military. Yet, 
effective knowledge management is vital for the military domain that is solely based 
upon knowledge—military intelligence. 
 
 
B. INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, many nations, including the Czech Republic, have 
found their security less threatened. Thus the focus of national security has changed, but 
the mission of the military intelligence community remains the same: to provide timely 
assessed intelligence for military commanders and to support military operations. 
 
Initially this section presents some basic information related to intelligence, as 
a foundation for further analysis. As military intelligence is just a more specific subset of 
intelligence, most of the general facts about intelligence also apply to military 
intelligence. 
 
1. Intelligence Functions and Intelligence Disciplines 
 
As the term "intelligence" is used in numerous ways, defining the term is 
essential. In terms of national security, intelligence, as it is more or less unanimously 
defined, can be seen as: 
• A process during which required information is collected, processed, 
analyzed, and disseminated to the customers of final intelligence. In other 
words, intelligence is a process that converts raw data into a solid product, 
which satisfies the needs of those to whom it is concerned. 
• A product representing the result of the intelligence process. 
• An organization or an agency, which actually conducts some or all of the 
intelligence functions. 
 
Many people assume that the main task of an intelligence service is to describe 
the truth about something in reality. As Lowenthal (2000) explains, intelligence is not 
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about truth. If something were known to be true, states would not need intelligence 
services to collect or to analyze the information about these facts. The requirement to 
always discover the truth would set a standard that no intelligence agency could achieve. 
Thinking of intelligence as a matter of describing approximate reality is more accurate. 
Intelligence tries to understand what is occurring in any given issue and tries to produce 
reliable, unbiased, and honest (i.e. objective and non-politicized) intelligence. 
 
So, why do we have intelligence agencies? Intelligence should exist solely to 
support decision-makers. To allow better decisions, intelligence agencies must provide 
decision-makers with accurate, timely, and tailored intelligence. This is true for every 
intelligence service—be it a national foreign intelligence service, a military intelligence 
agency at the strategic level, or a military intelligence unit on the battlefield. Any motive 
other than supporting decision-makers would be wasteful or even illegal. According to 
Lowenthal (2000) intelligence services exist for at least four reasons: 
(1) To Avoid Strategic Surprise: The leading goal of any intelligence service must 
be to monitor threats, troops, and events that can potentially jeopardize the 
nation's existence. 
(2) To Provide Long-term Expertise: As policy makers come and go, being versed 
in all the national security issues with which they deal is impossible. They 
need intelligence personnel with extensive expertise and knowledge on many 
subjects. The intelligence community has a relatively stable analytical staff, 
and it tends to have fewer political appointees than other elements of the state 
bureaucracy. 
(3) To Support the Policy Process: Policy makers constantly need tailored and 
timely intelligence that will provide background information and warnings. 
Intelligence agencies can prepare such information and assess the risks and 
benefits of the steps the policy makers intend to take. 
(4) To Maintain the Secrecy of Information, Needs, and Methods: Since 
adversaries and competitors withhold information, and since we also want to 
keep specific information secret, each nation must possess effective 
intelligence services. With such services, a nation has the means for collecting 
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and processing information about other potentially hostile nations while 
guarding its own sensitive information against the adversary nations.  
 
The complexity of all the functions listed above, coupled with the development of 
the technical means for collecting information, has led to a specialization in intelligence 
gathering. Hence separate, yet interconnected, intelligence disciplines have been created. 
Realistically, no single individual or organization can efficiently and accurately collect 
and process all the available information, and this fact has generated a need for 
intelligence specialization. Furthermore, considering the impact of IT on today’s society, 
further specialization will likely occur.  
 
Over the past four decades, NATO intelligence disciplines have evolved and have 
been categorized into five main categories: 
• Human Intelligence (HUMINT); 
• Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), which has two subcategories: 
• Communication Intelligence (COMINT), and 
• Electronic Intelligence (ELINT); 
• Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT);1 
• Imagery Intelligence (IMINT); 
• Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT). 
Obviously, HUMINT represents human, non-technical discipline while SIGINT, 
IMINT, and MASINT are mostly technical. OSINT comprises both human and technical 
approaches. 
  
2. Intelligence Process and Intelligence Cycle 
 
This section concentrates on intelligence as a process. According to current 
definitions,2 intelligence as a process involves requests for the collection and analysis of 
                                                 
1 This discipline is recognized only by the US intelligence. Other nations do not use this category 
as a separate intelligence discipline. Also, this category is not included in NATO allied doctrines, such as 
AJP-2.0. (2001) 
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specific types of information, and then provides the finished intelligence to decision-
makers. In these terms, the intelligence process should be understood as a set of 
interrelated steps, transforming raw information into a finished intelligence product. To 
describe the entire process, the intelligence community uses a model called the 
intelligence cycle.  
Most publications (e.g. AJP-2.0. 2001, FAS 1996) describe the intelligence cycle 
as both separated, and yet inter-connected, components of direction, collection, 
processing, analysis and production, and dissemination. To this, Lowenthal (2000, 
pp. 50-51) presents his more explicit model, which also contains consumption and 
feedback. To better describe the complexity of the intelligence process graphically, the 
author created an amended model of the intelligence cycle. The model is depicted in 
Figure 3. 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 See for example: AJP-2.0. 2001, p. 1-2-3 or Lowenthal 2000, p. 8. 






































The intelligence process, by nature, is rather continuous. The intelligence cycle 
has no specific or definite beginning or ending. Intelligence operates in an environment 
with erratic information, changing requirements, and unending analyses. However, the 
following separable components of the intelligence process have been determined: 
 
Planning and Direction: In the amended model presented in Figure 3, planning 
and direction are in the center as the core elements of the intelligence process. 
Intelligence organizations are predominatingly bureaucratic in nature, so planning and 
direction is vital to keep them effective. Moreover, as the intelligence budgets and 
manpower decrease and possible threats become more scattered, intelligence must be 
oriented toward the stated or implied needs of its customers. 
Planning and direction emanates outside the intelligence agency, but is also 
necessary inside the organization itself. As decision-makers pose their tasks and 
questions, an intelligence agency further specifies, analyzes, and refines the requirements 
to ensure that: 
• The intelligence organization comprehends the requirements; 
• The tasking authority understands the capability of the agency;  
• The available collection assets will be properly tasked in accordance with the 
intelligence requirements. 
Rather than seeing planning and direction as only the first phase of the 
intelligence cycle, one should understand it as a core element that receives tasks, sends 
commands and collects feedback almost continuously.  
 
Collection: Collection is the actual gathering of information needed to produce 
the finished intelligence. Intelligence assets collect information using different sources 
and methods, generally referred to as "intelligence disciplines." The five collection 
disciplines, HUMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, IMINT, and OSINT, were already introduced 
in the previous section. 
Collection assets gather information, in accordance with plans and procedures, to 
fill the gap between what is already known and what must be known in order to answer 
the consumers' questions and to fulfill the tasks assigned to the intelligence agency. 
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Processing and Exploitation: This phase fulfills a dual function in that the 
collected data and information are usually processed and then exploited for further 
analysis. This is especially common for the technical intelligence disciplines where data 
does not arrive in ready-to-use form. Processing converts the collected signals into 
images or other forms. In exploitation, analysts transfer the data and information into 
a more usable form through decryption, language translation, data reduction, and so on.  
 
Analysis and Production: Information is seldom usable in its raw form. Therefore, 
it must be analyzed. Furthermore, information can often be fragmentary and even 
contradictory. During the analysis, new value is added through collation, evaluation, 
analysis and integration, and interpretation. An analyst constructs a coherent picture of 
the evaluated information and produces the finished intelligence product that assesses 
events, judges possible implications and estimates further development. 
 
Dissemination: If the finished intelligence is not delivered to its intended 
recipients, it has zero value regardless of its quality. Thus dissemination is an equally 
important part of the intelligence cycle. The finished intelligence must be distributed in 
an accurate, complete, yet concise and timely fashion, and it must satisfy the customers’ 
needs. 
 
Counter-intelligence: The amended model sees counter-intelligence as an 
envelope protecting the entire intelligence process. Moreover, counter-intelligence should 
also protect the distinct parts of the intelligence cycle separately. However, one should 
consider that the counter-intelligence process moves through the same cycle as depicted 
in Figure 3. 
 
Consumption: Lowenthal includes "consumption" among the intelligence cycle 
steps. This thesis considers consumption as an interaction with intelligence, rather than as 
one particular step in the intelligence cycle itself. As mentioned before, intelligence 
products are intended to help decision-makers take an action. But, as Lowenthal points 
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out, “policy makers are free to reject or to ignore the intelligence they are offered.” 
(Lowenthal 2000, p. 8) An intelligence organization cannot compel its customers to use 
its product—it can only do the best to meet the customers’ needs. 
 
Feedback: Feedback is rarely seen in the intelligence community. This is reflected 
in many different models (e.g. AJP-2.0. 2001, FAS 1996), in which feedback is not even 
mentioned. As Lowenthal (2000) stressed, ideally the community would receive 
information about whether its product has been useful or not, about which areas of 
interest require increased attention, and so on. But in reality such feedback is rarely 
received. This lowers the effectiveness of the intelligence process. 
However, feedback can be considered as information flowing in an opposite 
direction throughout the intelligence cycle—as a tool beneficial to the community rather 
than as a separate component of the cycle itself. 
 
3. Common Problems and Challenges in Intelligence  
 
 Now, before entering the specifics of OSINT, some of the problems and 
challenges prevalent in intelligence will be discussed. Understanding the nature and 
causes of such challenges will establish a firm basis for the analyses in later chapters. 
 
Intelligence as a very old and frequently used tool of statecraft faces many 
difficulties. Some of the intelligence requirements have significantly changed over time 
while others remain almost constant. Here is an overview of main issues in contemporary 
intelligence: 
 
Intelligence Requirements: The current international situation is in many ways 
more complex and more difficult than the relatively "stable" bipolar Cold War. The 
absence of one or a few overwhelming intelligence requirements has been replaced by 
many new requirements, none of which has the same lasting importance. Unlike twelve 
years ago, nowadays intelligence issues are of the highest priority for rather short periods 
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of time. At the same time, the human and budget resources available to the intelligence 
community continue to decline in many countries.  
The U.S. Ambassador Robert Kimmitt, former Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs, once stated that the intelligence community “will have to be an inch 
deep and a mile wide, with the ability to go a mile deep on any given issue." No longer is 
there just one enemy creating one global nuclear threat—nowadays, there are many 
"newcomers" at play. Not only military personnel, installations or units, but also 
paramilitary and civilian organizations and individuals have gained the attention of the 
military intelligence. Rogue non-state actors, such as terrorists, ethnic extremists, and 
religious fanatics—all potential users of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)—rapidly increase the demand for intelligence supporting efforts (Tenet 2000). 
Today's electronic environment complicates the situation even more, allowing 
possible adversaries to act more effectively than before because interconnectivity has 
become global. 
 
Value and Vulnerability of Information: The information revolution has not been 
an easy transition from a person-to-person type of society to a global-information-
network society. Yet, today's information is equivalent to the information gathered a few 
centuries ago in terms of its importance. The propagation of satellites, massive databases, 
cellular phones, fax machines, and computer networks created a new dimension in the 
intelligence environment. 
In the electronically interconnected world, information moves at the speed of 
light, is nonmaterial, and is of enormous value—hence information itself has become 
a vital strategic resource (Schwartau 1996). On one side, information is now considerably 
more vulnerable; on the other side, it can be used with surprising effectiveness. 
Information that leads to correct decisions and wins the battle is a weapon in itself. 
 
Secrecy versus Openness: A vast amount of information is available from open 
sources. But we still need to gain information that our potential adversaries conceal while 
sufficiently protecting our own intelligence. Of course, existing and rising democracies 
seek as much openness and freedom of information as possible.  
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Knowledge often equates to power, so there will always be a tendency to keep at 
least some knowledge confidential. And some people will always want to acquire 
knowledge for their own use—for reasons that could be selfish, unethical, or even 
criminal. We are unable to change this situation today. As long as information can be 
kept secret or can be misused, such a situation prevails.  
However, it should be understood that intelligence need not be only about secrets. 
Definitely, intelligence collection has two facets—open and covert. Each side has its own 
importance and should be effectively employed and managed. But in practice, many 
segments of the intelligence community undervalue open-source intelligence. 
 
Intelligence "Stovepipes": Two characteristics related to intelligence disciplines 
are frequently denoted as intelligence "stovepipes." The first characteristic is that all 
disciplines but OSINT have end-to-end processes, from collection to dissemination. The 
second characteristic is that the intelligence disciplines are practically separated from one 
another, being competitors for various reasons. Thus intelligence disciplines are often 
visualized as distinct "pipelines" or "stovepipes"—complete, yet completely individual 
and separate processes.  
The five intelligence disciplines, HUMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, IMINT, and 
OSINT, have not developed evenly throughout NATO, and as a result, intelligence 
agencies do not manage them in similar manners. Each discipline has particular strengths 
and weaknesses, one working better or worse than the other in specific intelligence tasks. 
This situation stems from the Cold War when intelligence was more linear and oriented 
in one direction. Today, a number of individual organizations perform distinct missions 
and yet support an overlapping set of customers. Furthermore, these organizations have 
become competitors for resources. All of this regularly complicates the decisions about 
overall collection needs and resources. 
 
Physical Capabilities and Limitations of an Intelligence Analyst: Especially in the 
technical categories of intelligence, not all of the collected data are exploited and 
processed. The future development of sensors and advanced communication will increase 
that amount of unprocessed information, thus contributing to the all-source analysts’ 
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workload. Today, intelligence is becoming based on real-time demands, and intelligence 
consumers sometimes expect immediate answers while the intelligence analysts can offer 
only tentative analytical estimates. 
 
Information Overload: Widespread information technology and electronic 
communication has also created very specific problems in the intelligence community. 
On one hand, a vast amount of information is readily available and can be collected by all 
sorts of reconnaissance and intelligence assets. On the other hand, this availability creates 
an enormously high demand for analyses, processing, and dissemination of intelligence. 
Although the technical collection disciplines radically improved in terms of 
gaining information, this improved ability also inundates agencies with too much 
information. As the power of computers doubles every 18 to 24 months (Moore’s law), 
working with information and building knowledge has become the key for gaining the 
competitive advantage. How do we decide what information we need? Can we make 
rational, well-informed decisions about which information is truly valuable or which 
piece of information is even reliable?  
Today, the emphasis is still placed more on processing masses of information 
rather than on identifying and structuring information according to its likely utility. 
Unstructured information of all kinds is widely dispersed not only throughout the 
intelligence agencies, but also throughout different non-military organizations. For 
example, shortly after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, many journalists 
quickly obtained information that had been available prior to that terrifying date. But 
different elements of the data were spread throughout different agencies, and no person, 
organization or momentum was able to connect the whole puzzle that would prompt the 
requisite countermeasures. 
Information management is definitely an extraordinarily demanding task, but 
knowledge management is an even more crucial element to explore. 
 
Knowledge Management and Intelligence: In the corporate world, the growing 
importance of professional knowledge work has been reflected in the rapidly increased 
employment of computer and communication technologies. This has also been reflected 
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in the newly created managerial posts—such as "Chief Information Officer" (CIO) or 
"Chief Knowledge Officer" (CKO). The military services have also recognized the 
emerging importance of knowledge management. Not unlike the civilian sector, 
knowledge management has become a fad to many—and a nightmare to others. No 
wonder that in many cases, the design or reengineering of information systems did not 
follow the four-step procedure of the knowledge system and process design described 
before. Many systems, experimenting with software applications without a scientific 
basis, have been built by trial and error. 
Certainly, managing knowledge in such large and complex organizations as in the 
case of the military is quite difficult. With intelligence, the situation is even more 
problematic because all the services have developed their intelligence elements at 
different command and control levels. Furthermore, intelligence disciplines have not 
developed consistently throughout the intelligence community. 
Today, a more dynamic military environment creates more changes in the 
presence of military personnel in the battlefield. Examples from operations in Persian 
Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo showed that the rotation of personnel, for example, causes 
obvious losses of knowledge that were previously gained. Understanding various actions 
and events in the operational theater requires considerable time, and such knowledge has 
been hard to capture and to formalize for further use.  
 
 
C. OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT) 
 
This section briefly examines some aspects of open-source intelligence (OSINT). 
After open sources and OSINT are defined and categorized, the basic principles and 
current problems and challenges of OSINT are presented.  
 
1. Definitions and Categories 
 
Open sources are unclassified sources of information in the public domain or 
available from commercial services (Denning 1999, Lowenthal 2000). They can be 
gained in various forms: 
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• Printed Publications, such as newspapers, magazines, journals, books, reports, 
conference proceedings, and manuals; 
• Broadcast Services, such as radio and television; 
• Electronic Resources, such as off-line and on-line information databases, the 
Internet, and multimedia CDs; 
• Public Demonstrations, such as speeches, hearings, press conferences, 
symposia, and trade shows; 
• Conversation with scholars, experts, and event participants. 
 
Categories of Open Sources: Open sources are categorized according to their 
media, on-line or off-line accessibility, costs, and so on. This thesis classifies open 
sources as follows (NOSINTH 2001, OSINTH 1997, and others): 
• Traditional Media Sources: This category encompasses domestic and foreign 
print and broadcast media, radio and TV, as well as electronically available 
products. Media sources still remain the core of OSINT. The US Foreign 
Broadcast Service (FBIS) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
Monitoring Service are considered excellent examples of media sources. 
• Internet: The Internet is mostly used for Web browsing and e-mail, but it 
provides an array of other services—electronic conferences, news groups, and 
also provides direct access to a growing number of specialized databases. In 
fact, the Internet has become the communication backbone of the commercial 
world. 
• Commercial Online Premium Sources: These sources are usually civilian 
commercial organizations charging a subscription fee or a usage fee for online 
access to their information. Many of these sources represent years of work on 
specific subjects, offering validated information, indexes, abstracts, and so on. 
Such services can also be obtained through information brokers or 
professional librarians. Frequently cited examples of commercial online 
premium services are LEXIS-NEXIS, FACTIVA, and DIALOG. 
• Other Commercial Sources: This category includes professional services 
available through direct subscription, both on the Internet and in the form of 
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hardcopy or CD-ROM publications. Many of the services are directly oriented 
to areas of military interest. For example, The British Library monitors 
international publications and conferences about many general topics, 
including military matters, and produces excellent proceedings; Orders of 
Battle, Inc. offers complete orders of battle of 188 countries.3 
• Gray Literature: Gray literature refers to public non-proprietary documents 
that are available in very limited numbers and are mostly accessible only 
inside the country of publication. This category encapsulates working papers, 
technical reports and blueprints, pre-prints, and so on. Gray literature, 
positioned between online information and human expertise, contains an 
important collection of knowledge.  
• Commercial Imagery: Overhead imagery is no longer solely a military 
domain. In recent years, commercial industry gained significant capabilities, 
such as high-resolution electro-optical imagery, useful especially for multi-
national joint combined military operations. For example, SPOT Image offers 
various products ranging from digital geospatial data, to overhead imagery, 
radar imagery, natural hazard assessment, evaluated image maps and 3-D 
terrain mapping. 
• Overt Human Experts and Observers: For many topics finding exactly what is 
needed is hard. Moreover, both electronic and printed public information is 
scarce for many countries. In all cases, an expert or an observer with direct 
experience represents the ultimate open source. First, internal subject-matter 
experts who are scattered across various elements of the organizational 
structure can be found within the military organization. Second, based on their 
accomplishments and publications, outside experts can be located. Finally, 
"local knowledge" experts, such as frequent travelers, local residents, and 
event participants, can frequently provide deep insights into specific 
conditions.  
                                                 
3 Actual numbers may vary. See http://www.orbat.com. 
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The above categories are not intended as strict divisions and may overlap to some 
degree. They are mentioned here merely to provide a sketch of open sources.  
 
Open-Source Services: Aside from the information provided, many commercial 
sites also offer extended services associated with open sources. Such services vary, but 
they generally fall onto the following three categories (NOSINTH 2001): 
• Collection Services: Collection services include online data collections by 
specialized researchers, off-line acquisition of documents or gray literature, 
different forms of surveys and polling, private investigations, aerial 
surveillance, and so on. Many essential documents can be gained through 
private-sector organizations that are established worldwide.  
• Processing Services: This category embodies data conversion, indexing and 
abstracting, interpretation of imagery or signals, translations from foreign 
languages, database creation, and other similar services.  
• Analysis and Production Services: Individual experts and commercial and 
academic organizations can be hired to analyze and produce various services, 
especially when the topic requires high expertise or the topic is out of reach of 
one's organization. Outsourcing may deliver excellent results if real experts 
are employed. 
 
OSINT: Similarly to the other intelligence disciplines, OSINT involves much 
more than just collection; it goes through all the phases as described in the intelligence 
cycle. So, processing and analyzing the collected open-source information adds value. 
Open-source intelligence, like any other discipline, requires humans—to exploit the 
information, to sort the important from the unimportant, to retrieve relevant knowledge, 
and to judge the reliability of the source.  
The NATO Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security Doctrine 
(AJP-2.0. 2001) defines OSINT as "Intelligence derived from a wide range of open 
sources such as radio, television, newspapers, and books to which the public has access." 
The NATO Open-Source Intelligence Handbook (NOSINTH 2001) further divides 
intelligence emanating from open sources into two distinct categories: 
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• Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT): OSINT applies the proven model of the 
intelligence cycle to the broad diversity of open-source information and 
creates intelligence products; 
• Validated Open-Source Intelligence (V-OSINT): V-OSINT possesses a very 
high degree of certainty. It can be produced by all-source professionals with 
access to classified information, or it can originate from trusted open sources 
whose validity is without question.  
 
2. Problems and Challenges in Open-Source Intelligence  
 
OSINT, as one of the intelligence disciplines, bears some of the general problems 
of intelligence "business"; OSINT also carries some specific problems not seen in other 
disciplines. In this section, some of the prevailing problems and challenges in OSINT 
will be discussed. 
 
Use of Open Sources: During the Cold War, at least 20% of the information 
contained in intelligence reports came from the public domain. Today, in light of the 
greater openness of governments around the world, that figure can be as high as 95% 
(Johnson 2000).  Although the percentage varies with the originator—starting as low as 
40% (CIA), OSINT clearly plays an important role in intelligence.4  
Certainly, open sources could replace pure field intelligence in many areas, or at 
least could compete sufficiently.5 Keenan (1997) projected that up to 95% of what the US 
government needs to know could be acquired through a careful and competent study of 
open-source information that exists within the country. Indeed, in this area the United 
States has attained a high level of success. But many other countries, including the Czech 
                                                 
4 Here is a true story: When NATO decided to bomb targets in Kosovo, many European countries 
had their intelligence agencies on stand-by alert. One nameless intelligence team, tasked to report when the 
mission would start, received this advice from the supervisor: “Switch-on the TV and watch CNN!” 
5 See, for example: A story about British intelligence using mainly open sources during the 
Falklands War (Adams 2000, p. 225). Another example is a "contest" between Robert Steele and CIA to 
obtain a complete intelligence report on the African nation of Burundi over a three-day period (Denning 
1999, p. 80).  
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Republic, can also gain a significant portion of their needed information from their open 
sources and from sources abroad. 
However, OSINT should not be the only intelligence collection discipline used to 
provide accurate intelligence. OSINT can serve as the first resource for any intelligence 
analysis—but cannot replace the other disciplines in full. Clandestine collection and 
information operations cannot be omitted; in some cases they can "make the difference 
between life and death on the battlefield or between an aborted and a tragic terrorist 
incident." (Denning 1999, p. 81)  For this reason, there should be no competition between 
OSINT and other disciplines. Instead, OSINT should serve as a broad base for the other 
intelligence disciplines in which intelligence must be collected by other than overt means. 
OSINT is vital to the all-source intelligence analysts because "it provides the 
historical background information, the political, economic, social, demographic, 
technical, natural, and geographic context for operations, critical personality information, 
and access to a wide variety of tactically useful information about infrastructure, terrain 
and indigenous matters." (NOSINTH 2001) For most cases, OSINT can really serve as 
a foundation for constructing the whole intelligence picture—principally when the 
military must understand its involvement in non-traditional tasks, such as ethnic and 
religious conflicts, clashes for scarce natural resources, mass migrations, natural and 
technical disasters, international organized crime, and so on.  
OSINT can contribute to classified collection methods in the following areas: 
• Tip-offs: Electronic media, the Internet in particular, provide vast 
opportunities for information exchange. As a result, the number of areas with 
denied access to information has diminished since the end of the Cold War. 
Today, many services provide non-traditional news alerts, witnesses post their 
messages on the Internet newsgroups, and so on. Hence, there are many 
situations where OSINT can provide the first indication of an event—even 
before it is covered by the media such as CNN. 
• Targeting: Both OSINT and classified sources can be optimized for 
a particular intelligence problem. This allows intelligence personnel to 
concentrate on issues that can only be discovered covertly and also to validate 
the OSINT products via the classified collection. Thus, OSINT optimized with 
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collection from other sources allows all-source analysts to work more 
effectively. 
• Validation: Classified reports are often narrowly focused and represent 
separate pieces of intelligence. To counter the preoccupation with only one 
direction, one can place such reports into a wider context, supplementing 
necessary background information from the OSINT environment. Cross 
checking such intelligence through multiple open sources can assure its 
validity. 
• Cover: In some instances, open sources can serve as a plausible cover for the 
sanitation of classified reporting. If one understands the information available 
in unclassified systems, the ability to use a plausible alternate open source as 
a cover is facilitated. Thus, open sources can serve as a shield that can conceal 
the real source of the information. 
 
Misconceptions: Theoretically, the greater availability of open sources should 
ease the task of the intelligence. However, intelligence services were created to collect 
secrets—and using open-source information seems not congruent to the task at hand. 
That is probably why intelligence agencies have difficulties assimilating open sources 
into their processes. Intelligence services often do not want to confess that much of their 
work is based on open sources. Many intelligence agencies will not admit that they rely 
on OSINT heavily because they fear that their budgets will be severely cut, that they will 
lose professional respect, or even that their departments will be eliminated. They assume 
that most taxpayers might ask, “Why do I have to pay for an intelligence agency that 
reads the newspaper?” Some people mistakenly equate the value of intelligence with the 
degree of difficulty involved in obtaining it and with the classification level assigned to 
it.  
Another common misconception about OSINT is that it can be obtained without 
cost. But one can easily understand that gaining information from open sources is subject 
to direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include the cost of printed materials, the fees for 
subscription to electronic resources, the expense for experts from outside the 
organization, and so on. Indirect costs include, for example, expenditures for supporting 
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IT tools, paying analysts inside the organization, and opportunity costs. However while 
open-source information is not free, the associated costs are often far less than those of 
collecting and processing classified information. 
Another misunderstanding is that the Internet is the primary origin of most 
OSINT. Indeed, the Internet has about 500 million users and is increasingly used as 
a means of open-source collection that holds about one billion documents, many of which 
are linked. Expert forums, including private teams with their own newsletters and e-mail 
information alerts, represent important parts of the Internet exploitation. Yet this 
represents only about 30% of the total open sources. Moreover, unlike printed 
publications, anyone can post anything on the Internet—which increases the probability 
of obtaining fictitious or erroneous information if one relies on the Internet exclusively. 
This is commonly known as the "garbage in, garbage out" effect. Information relevance 
and correctness has certainly become an extremely sensitive issue. Furthermore, extant 
active Web agents called "intelligent agents," "network robots" or simply "bots" 
searching the Internet for specific information cover only about 15% of the visible Web, 
overlooking complex sites with many subsequent levels known as the "deep Web." On 
the other hand, bots can inundate one with vast quantities of data in response to simple 
queries. So Internet search engines might return thousands of links for certain queries 
while important information may be omitted if the usual keywords are missing. This 
degrades the practicability and usefulness of bots in some cases. Clearly, one must 
approach the Internet as just one of the open sources and be aware of its strengths and 
weaknesses. The Internet, despite its rapid growth, is more of a vehicle for open 
cooperation and collaboration than a reservoir of flawless and reliable knowledge.  
 
Advantages and Disadvantages: The major advantage of OSINT is its 
accessibility. It is readily obtainable although it requires collection. Open sources are 
available extensively and that also makes OSINT less susceptible to manipulation and 
deception. Moreover, unlike covert operations, OSINT is not hazardous for the collectors. 
Furthermore, unlike any other intelligence category, OSINT products can be shared with 
virtually anybody, without requesting security clearances.  
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All of this makes OSINT extremely valuable for cooperation with civilian 
coalition partners and for intelligence dissemination in the multi-national non-Article-V 
operations.6 As the role of the military shifts from collective defense to collective 
security, many non-traditional non-military cases require intelligence sharing with non-
governmental and humanitarian organizations. OSINT appears to be a primary platform 
for such challenges. 
In the case of NATO multi-national coalition operations, the involved nations 
tend to protect their national intelligence resources and their intelligence services do not 
cooperate well with each other. Yet, the same nations will be willing to use an open-
source environment for both information gathering and intelligence sharing. So, in such 
a case, the combined joint command should initially use the OSINT process instead of 
turning to classified national intelligence collection. Moreover, NATO has usually no 
tasking authority over national intelligence assets while it can use open networks to 
propagate its intelligence needs without severe limitations. 
The main disadvantage of OSINT is its abundance. Computer technology's ability 
to produce, to manipulate, and to store information increased exponentially, creating an 
information explosion. So, sifting through the information field to collect information 
that is relevant, correct, and needed has become more and more difficult. This is often 
called the "wheat and chaff" problem. As previously stated, single analysts and analyst 
cells cannot process all the available information. The intelligence community must find 
ways to create and to maintain virtual nets of information sources, OSINT collectors, and 
analysts. 
Furthermore, military intelligence must use all the presently available options to 
disseminate OSINT products. Classified networks have the principal disadvantage for 
OSINT dissemination in that they must separate the products from the sources. Systems 
based on the Virtual Private Network (VPN) arrangement can provide ready access to the 
original materials with the advantages of security safeguards. The US system NIPRNET, 
                                                 
6 Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that NATO members must consider coming to the 
aid of an ally under attack. However, it does not guarantee assistance. Article V is the Treaty's key 
provision. It states, in part, "…an armed attack against one or more allies shall be considered an attack 
against them all." Since the early 1990s, NATO has begun to adopt new missions, such as crisis 
management and peacekeeping, sometimes referred to as "non-Article V operations." 
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used by different US military services to share unclassified information, and the US 
Open-Source Information System (OSIS), which is a confederation of information 
systems serving the intelligence community with open-source intelligence, are examples 
of an OSINT sharing environment.  
 
Naturally, OSINT is not an exclusive part of intelligence agencies—in practice, 
that is impossible. Open-source exploitation is relevant not only to the intelligence 
professionals, but also to all military personnel who may need open-source information. 
Indeed, intelligence professionals must support commanders and other decision-makers. 
But if adequate answers are readily available from open sources, engaging an intelligence 
agency is just pure inefficiency. Therefore, intelligence professionals should encourage 
their superiors and customers to manage their own open-source collections. If a robust 
OSINT system exists, it can save much time and reduce unnecessary requests for 
information. Once all staff elements have direct access to open sources, the intelligence 
staff can help facilitate the OSINT knowledge flow while evaluating sources and 
providing professional guidance. 
All of the intelligence disciplines but OSINT have their dedicated collectors, 
processors and exploiters. In the case of OSINT, analysts are often expected to act as 
their own collectors. This situation would be considered preposterous if it happened in 
any other intelligence discipline. This flawed perception represents one of the major 
challenges OSINT faces.  
 
Obviously, intelligence agencies under the pressure of cutbacks, reduction of 
personnel, and increasing intelligence requirements can hardly compete with CNN’s 
worldwide coverage. So, military intelligence does not need to conceal its reliance on 
open sources or, even worse, to conceal that it collects open-source information by 
classifying it. Instead, it must develop its OSINT branch to be a state-of-the-art 
information collector and establish proper procedures to manage the vast amount of 
information that is available from open sources. Open sources should also be the first 
choice in the collection process because OSINT conserves resources by reducing the 
unnecessary use of costly covert means. And finally, OSINT represents a usable platform 
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for disseminating vast amounts of information and the unclassified finished intelligence 
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III. CZECH MILITARY, INTELLIGENCE, AND OSINT 
This chapter examines the status of the Czech military, intelligence services, and 
use of OSINT. The first section traces the current security environment of the Czech 
Republic focusing on the main security concerns of the state. Also, the principal tasks of 
the military are surveyed and categorized. The second section of this chapter introduces 
the Czech intelligence services, particularly, the military intelligence. Moreover, current 
intelligence requirements are listed as a base for further analysis of possible applications 
of OSINT. The last section follows the four stages of the knowledge system and process 
design to analyze OSINT in the Czech military intelligence.  
 
 
A. CZECH SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE MILITARY 
 
The Czech Republic was established on January 1, 1993 and was grounded on the 
Czechoslovakian democratic tradition created before WWII. The Czech leadership had to 
consider the geopolitical definition and the external security environment that 
Czechoslovakia had faced since its creation in 1918. During this period, adverse powers 
militarily occupied the country twice—in 1939 and 1968. These interventions and the 
nation's subsequent loss of independence, accompanied with economic, cultural, and 
moral devastation weakened the nation's resolve to defend and nurture democratic values. 
This weakening even included the military defense of the state. These experiences also 
negatively distorted the public's image of the armed forces and the nation's international 
conduct.  
 
1. New Security Environment 
 
The Czech Republic, formerly Czechoslovakia, was a part of the Warsaw Pact for 
four decades. After the so-called Velvet Revolution in November 1989, the Czech 
Republic began developing a democracy. Dynamic changes in the political, economical, 
and social situation in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990's, as well as increased 
globalization and international exchange, raised many national security questions. Now 
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being part of NATO, the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic have developed new 
defense concepts and doctrines as a result of such influences.  
 
After removing the old communist regime in the 1990, the newly sovereign 
federation had to create a new security policy. Three years later, the Czech security had 
to be reconsidered again when the Czech Republic and Slovakia divided. From 1997 to 
1999, the Czech security and military strategies had to be changed once again—this time 
moving away from a purely national posture toward a collective defense organization 
within the NATO structure. 
Nowadays, although the Cold War is long over, the Czech Republic sees NATO 
as the key security organization in Europe. On 12 March 1999, the Czech Republic joined 
NATO, thus acquiring the security guarantees of a collective defense in accordance with 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO membership obligated the Czech Republic 
to reinforce its own defense capacity and to share in the defense of its allies. Participating 
in NATO involves assuming full responsibility for decisions and being prepared to share 
in their implementation. The new Strategic Concept, approved by the NATO summit in 
Washington in April 1999, expands NATO's fundamental tasks to include a share in 
crisis management throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, to develop a partnership and to 
cooperate with other states in the area. 
Indeed, NATO is being transformed from an essentially military organization to a 
more political one. The likely accession of new member states from the Baltic in the fall 
of 2002 will further accelerate the metamorphosis of the Alliance from an instrument for 
delivering collective defense to an organization for managing collective security. The 
Alliance with less US military presence and with more involvement from its European 
members will certainly be different from the body "reinvented" in April 1999. Many 
European countries want to more actively ensure the security of the Euro-Asian region. 
The Czech Republic wants to assist actively in the important role played by the EU 
security bodies. The Czech political leadership sees a partnership in the Common 
European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) as a way to further increase the 
responsibility and participation in the European collective security. 
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The current Czech defense policy is based on the hypothesis of the indivisibility 
of security and on the universality of basic human rights and freedoms. The Czech 
Republic is therefore by no means indifferent to the fate of other nations and regions. It 
identifies its own security with the global security situation and is prepared to work 
actively with the international community to solve these problems. The Czech Republic 
makes it a priority to solve crises peacefully, but it may decide to use force in accordance 
with constitutional law if necessary (NSS 2001). 
 
2. Current Threats and Risks to Czech National Security 
 
As already mentioned, the Czech Republic judges threats to its security in the 
wider Euro-Asian context. The international community is trying to maintain or to restore 
peace, to protect human rights and freedoms, to condemn and punish war crimes, to 
create democratic institutions, and to foster economic recovery and regional 
development. However, inconsistently applied political and economic reforms have 
generated a number of new problems, including lowered standards of living and booming 
organized crime and corruption.  
 
The regions in the southeast and east of Central Europe pose the most serious 
global threats to European security and to Czech security in particular. The Balkan crisis 
has not been fully solved yet; religious and ethnic tensions have been rising in the Trans-
Caucasus region and Central Asia; and a critical situation has also evolved in some 
regions of Russia. Economical and social instability in those areas, the spread of 
individual or group violence, and negative demographic trends are substantial, even 
though indirect, risks to Czech security.  
Widespread political and economic migration results from regional conflicts and 
differences in the standard of living. Migration is a sensitive issue in the European 
cultural and historical environment. Insularity of some population groups condemns 
immigrants to the margin of society where they can be lured into individual and 
organized crime. In turn, the native citizens reject further immigration. 
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The end of the Cold War substantially relaxed many tensions and significantly 
lowered the risk of worldwide confrontation. After the Iron Curtain fell, the national 
threats for states on both sides of the curtain changed radically both in positive and 
negative ways. Now, new threats are surfacing while some long-term problems persist. In 
the case of the Czech Republic, the National Security Strategy, first established in 1998 
and amended in 2000, lists nine possible threats (listed below). Only two of them are 
directly linked with military threats or attacks. The other seven deal with economical, 
political, terrorist, and drug proliferation issues. The potential security threats and risks 
are defined in terms of their probability as follows (NSS 2001): 
(1) Natural Disasters, Industrial and Environmental Accidents, Emergence and 
Spreading of Epidemics: These risks, permanently present and highly topical, 
can emerge within a few hours or days, and their nature and extent are 
difficult to predict.  
(2) Disturbance or Abuse of Standard International Economic Relations: 
Disruptions of flows of strategic commodities and raw materials, as well as 
attacks on computer networks or threats to security of information databases, 
represent significant danger to the internal economic affairs of the Czech 
Republic.  
(3) Individual Acts of Terrorism and Organized Activities of International Crime 
of an Extraordinary Extent: Attacks against citizens and economic, 
infrastructural, or administrative facilities may inflict severe casualties. 
Although the Czech Republic is not considered a potential terrorist target, it 
cannot disregard such threats.  
(4) Massive Waves of Migration: The vast number of immigrants to the country 
could become violent, both inside and outside the state's borders. 
(5) Violence by Alien Powers: Foreign countries may conduct violence against 
persons or property in the Czech Republic because the country has 
participated in international peace-support operations or humanitarian 
missions. 
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(6) Threats to Essential Principles of Democracy and Civil Liberties in Other 
Countries: Internal political violence and low intensity conflicts outside the 
Czech territory could seriously endanger international security.  
(7) Extensive Subversive Actions: Adverse forces can execute subversive actions 
to render the Czech Republic's defense assets useless and to disrupt the 
country’s transition to the state of war. 
(8) Direct Threat of Aggression. An attack against an allied nation is a direct 
threat to the Czech Republic. 
(9) Direct Military Attack against the Czech Republic.  
The risks listed in paragraphs two to six above are highly relevant. They can be 
initiated in combinations and can therefore produce threats that are difficult to predict. 
Such risks can be activated in a few days to several years. The military will only assist in 
eliminating such risks and its deployment will involve a limited use of combat assets.  
The risks specified in paragraphs seven to nine above obviously pertain to the 
military. Their current probability is low, and they are easier to predict. Such risks can be 
activated in months to years, and they would inflict major destruction. To eliminate such 
risks, the Armed Forces would be engaged in progressively escalating combat. 
 
3. Czech Military 
 
The Czech military has marched along a crooked and rough road—from the 
highly politicized and anti-Western service of the 1980's to the NATO-allied army at the 
end of the twentieth century. Today, the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR)7 is certainly 
different from that of twelve years ago. The early 1990's realigned the structure, the 
personnel, and the orientation of the Armed Forces owing to the end of the Cold War and 
the fall of the communist regime. The disinterest of top policy-makers in security and 
defense matters in the mid-1990's negatively imprinted the Czech military, leaving it 
                                                 
7 The name "Army" does not have the same meaning in the Czech Republic as it does in the USA, 
for example. In the Czech Republic the word encompasses all three military services—the Ground Forces, 
the Air Force, and the Territorial Defense Forces. See the organizational structure of the ACR, described 
later in this chapter.  
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without any nation-level defense policy and allowing unsystematic decisions. And NATO 
membership brought a large set of new requirements during the late 1990's.  
 
Indeed, the Czech military's doctrines, structure, and tasks have changed 
significantly since 1990. During the 1990's, the Czech Republic suffered drastic declines 
in the size of the military structure and personnel. Also, the cutbacks in the military 
budgets significantly eroded the combat capabilities, simply because the extent of 
equipment and personnel reduction did not match the decreases in funding. Moreover, 
until the succession to NATO, the Czech political leadership paid only limited attention 
to security and defense issues, which worsened some of the problems. Unfavorable public 
opinion, limited expertise of the top military leadership, controversial decisions about 
procurements and modernization, as well as shortages in the readiness and training 
accompanied the Czech Republic's integration into NATO.  
 
Despite the Czech Republic's small size, the contribution to NATO's missions, 
although severely limited militarily, has become highly valuable politically. Recent 
participation in many UN-based or NATO-based operations, such as in the Persian Gulf 
or in the former Yugoslavia, has proved that the Czech Republic desires a useful role in 
alliance operations. As to the current comparisons with other countries of similar size and 
military capabilities, such as Portugal, the Czech Republic is not perceived as a "free 
rider" but rather is seen as an average or a below-average NATO member in terms of 
contribution. 
Like other NATO members, the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic have 
earmarked most of their forces for the Alliance—78%. However, having all the units 
achieve the NATO standard capabilities, as set in the Force Goals is proving difficult. 
Given the current state of build-up, training, and logistic support of the forces, even high-
priority units would have difficulties in terms of the required readiness, level of training, 
compatibility of weapons and equipment, command and control systems, transportability 
and mobility, firepower, efficient engagement, and force sustainability, if they were 
evaluated in accordance with the Force Standards for the Rapid and Immediate Reaction 
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Forces.8 NATO standards and the interoperability requirements certainly represent the 
main NATO-related concern of the ACR. (ARCTSC 2001) 
 
Now, let's focus on the principal tasks, the organizational structure, and the 
reform of the ACR. This will encompass the current and the future environments of the 
Czech military, thus providing a sufficient base for the knowledge system and process 
design. 
 
 Tasks: According to the National Military Strategy (NMS 1999), the ACR has 
four principal tasks: 
(1) To Defend the Czech Republic against an Outside Attack: To defend the 
country's territory once an outside adversary has attacked it, the ACR will 
conduct operations either independently or together with NATO forces. The 
Armed Forces will assign and prepare one to two tactical groupings of 
peacetime strength units for rapid deployment to eliminate local destructive 
operations of forces organized along military or paramilitary lines. In the case 
of an extensive threat to national security, the ACR will continue to reinforce 
peacetime strength units as necessary. Also, it will prepare territorial defense 
elements to protect important facilities and assets in cooperation with other 
regular forces. To be able to defend its country, the ACR continuously 
prepares a build-up of troops to wartime strength and their deployment in 
a mobile, flexible, deep operational formation in order to conduct operations 
along one threatened axis, either independently or together with the allied 
forces. Moreover, the ACR builds and prepares the infrastructure to support 
operations of their own troops and to allow Alliance forces to be received and 
deployed in the country's territory. And finally, the Czech military provides 
for and conducts training of the professionals, conscripts, and reservists and 
participates in the education and training of Czech citizens for the defense. 
                                                 
8 These standards have been established by the Allied Command in Europe (ACE) for the force 
performance evaluations at the tactical and operational levels (TACEVAL, or OPEVAL, respectively). 
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(2) To Take Part in Defending the Alliance: The Czech Republic, as a full 
member of NATO, partakes in protecting freedom, security, and other vital 
interests of all the Alliance members. To fulfill its obligations in accordance 
with the North-Atlantic Treaty, the Czech Republic established its NATO-
command forces, NATO-assigned forces, and NATO-earmarked forces. These 
forces are built and trained as professional combined-arms formations and 
units, which are ready for airlift by allied air assets and can conduct operations 
outside the Czech territory as a part of the NATO task forces. As its top 
priority, the ACR develops and provides for compatibility and interoperability 
with the armed forces of the Alliance, paying particular attention to command 
and control systems, information and intelligence systems, and technical 
surveillance systems.  
(3) To Participate in Peace-Support Operations, Rescue-and-Relief Operations, 
and Humanitarian Operations: The ACR takes an active part in peace-support 
operations and also participates in rescue, relief, and humanitarian operations 
abroad. It assigns forces up to a mechanized battalion plus a special company, 
the combined number of which is up to 1,000 people. The ACR builds and 
prepares military rescue units and other available peacetime forces capable of 
saving civilian population from dangers threatening their lives, health, or 
property. Depending on the tasks at hand, the military selectively reinforces 
and deploys specialized units to provide assistance in the event of a natural 
disaster or industrial accidents abroad.  
(4) To Participate in the Elimination of Non-military Threats: The military can 
confront non-military threats to national security and can protect internal 
security and maintain public order within the country. To be able to 
participate in such tasks, the ACR selectively prepares a part of the ground, 
air, and territorial defense forces to act as reinforcements of the Police of the 
Czech Republic (PCR).  
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Organization: The current organizational structure of the Army of the Czech 
Republic is depicted in Figure 4. 9 
 
                                                 
9 The figure depicts only main combat and support formations down to the brigade/base level. 
Legend: HQ = Headquarters; MD = Mechanized Division; RDB = Rapid Deployment Brigade; MB = 
Mechanized Brigade; TMB = Training and Mobilization Base; CSTBs = Combat Support Training Bases 
(one per each combat support element, i.e. reconnaissance and electronic warfare, signal, artillery, 
engineer, and chemical XXX); AFB = Air Force Base; HAB = Helicopter Air Base; AFTB = Air Force 
Transportation Base; SAFB = Special Air Force Base; ADMB = Anti-Defense Missile Brigade; RWS = 
Surveillance and Warning Sector; RHQ = Regional Headquarters; MTBs = Mobilization and Training 
Bases; RTBs = Rescue and Training Bases. 
Figure 4. Organizational Structure of the ACR 
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Reform of the military: The Czech military still has to overcome many negative 
preconceptions. Although some of the biases stem from the traditional Czech anti-
military proclivities, low regard for the military should not be treated as something 
deterministic. Second, other more realistic problems, such as insufficient and ineffective 
planning and budgeting, lack of modern weaponry, incompatible command and 
communication systems, and unsuited proportion of personnel still exist.  
The ACR has been continuously restructuring since its official formation in 1993. 
During the process, the ACR has attempted to adapt internally to the external 
environment. Much progress has been made, especially in preparing for membership in 
and accession to the Alliance. The invitation to the Czech Republic to join NATO and the 
fulfillment of the minimum military requirements as of the accession day is undoubtedly 
a great success. Yet, none of the restructuring processes undertaken so far has brought 
about a qualitative change in the ACR's capabilities. Also, many disputable decisions 
have been based upon political and personal interests, not always in line with the 
worldwide military trends. The purchase of the L-159 light attack aircraft and upgrading 
of the T-72 main battle tank, for example, have consumed substantial funds from the 
defense budget. (ARCTSC 2001) 
The last reform of the ACR, started in August 2001, is designed to improve the 
position of the ACR in a democratic society and to allow the ACR to cope better with the 
present security risks and challenges while using the allocated funds most efficiently. The 
new military leadership, especially the Minister of Defense Jaroslav Tvrdík, clearly 
expressed the needs for more transparent management, high economic efficiency, and 
increased force effectiveness. For the ACR to fulfill the vital and strategic interests of the 
Czech Republic adequately, it must also have the required capabilities. Along with other 
alterations, reforming the Armed Forces will cause the following changes (Reform 2001): 
• The Czech Republic will gradually shift to fully professional armed forces and 
cancel the conscript service. By 2003, the ACR will prepare the groundwork 
for necessary legislative changes toward all-voluntary forces; by 2005, all 
NATO-earmarked forces should be fully professionalized; by 2007, the 
Armed Forces will be all-volunteer personnel.  
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• The ACR will be divided into Deployable Forces and In-Place Forces. 
Furthermore, they will be sub-divided into High Readiness Forces, Forces of 
Lower Readiness, and Long-Term Build-Up Forces. 
• Well-equipped, well-trained, and well-supported deployable forces will be the 
priority.  
• The ACR will focus on developing passive surveillance systems and 
protection against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly detecting 
and identifying chemical and biological substances. 
• The ACR will improve its capabilities in psychological operations, deceptive 
operations and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). 
• By 2007, the Armed Forces will not exceed 34,000 to 36,000 active soldiers 
plus up to 10,000 civilian employees.10 The maximum wartime numbers will 
not exceed 1.8 times their peacetime counterparts. 11  
 
The ACR's definite role remains the same—to guarantee the defense of the Czech 
Republic. Possible military involvement has these three alternatives: 
• All Czech Republic's armed forces will participate in one major Article-V 
operation; 
• The Czech Republic will send a brigade-size contingent (up to 5,000 persons 
without replacement) to participate in one operation for up to six months; 
• The Czech Republic will participate in one long-term operation with 
a battalion-size contingent (up to 1,000 persons without replacement) and, 
concurrently, in another operation with a smaller contingent (up to 250 
persons). 
Aside from that, the ACR must be able to provide forces and assets for the Czech 
integrated rescue-and-relieve system inside the country.  
                                                 
10 As of January 1, 2001, the Armed Forces totaled 69,296 persons; 23,184 of them were 
professional soldiers, 24,955 conscripts, and 21,157 civilian employees. See for example 
http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/p07.htm. 
11 To better understand the insufficiencies of the ACR, as well as to apprehend the amount of 
work accomplished so far, one should see the analyses provided by the Center for Preparation of the 
Armed Forces Reform, posted at http://www.army.cz/reforma/index.htm. 
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Figure 5 illustrates the future organizational structure, as proposed by the 
conception.12  
Regarding the military intelligence, the reform concept stresses the importance of 
analytical outputs for the defense planning and preparation. Yet, the military intelligence 
will probably be included in the whole reformative package covering all Czech 
intelligence and counter-intelligence services. The intention to reduce the overall number 
of services has existed since the early 1990's, accompanied by various inter-agency "turf 
wars;" so it is likely that the military intelligence will face some reform in the near future. 
 
                                                 
12 The figure depicts only main combat formations down to the brigade/base level. Legend: HQ = 
Headquarters; RDB = Rapid Deployment Brigade; MB = Mechanized Brigade; AFB = Air Force Base; 
HAB = Helicopter Air Base; AFTTB = Air Force Transportation and Training Base; ADMB = Anti-
Defense Missile Brigade; RHQ = Regional Headquarters; MTB = Mobilization and Training Base. 
Figure 5. Organizational Structure of the ACR by 2007 
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As of April 2002, the Conception of the Professional Build-up of the ACR has 
been prepared and submitted for approval. The government acquainted with the 
document; however, with the upcoming elections in June 2002, the administration 




B. CZECH INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 
 
"I don't need intelligence services. CNN is enough for me." This comment, 
credited to Prime Minister Václav Klaus in 1994 (Hořejší 1997), summarizes the general 
attitude of both politicians and the public. This attitude has not changed much since 1990. 
The Czech intelligence services, including the military intelligence, underwent many 
reorganizations and management changes. During the mid-1990's the power over the 
intelligence agencies shifted from the President and Parliament to the government and 
Prime Minister, but they had little interest in exercising it. Only in the late 1990's did the 
government and the Parliament formulate basic policies, amend obsolete laws and create 
new ones, and constitute clearer oversight over the intelligence services. 
After the split with Slovakia and the end of the federation in the 1993, the Czech 
Republic established four intelligence agencies, based on their federative predecessors: 
• The Bureau for Foreign Contacts and Information (Úřad pro zahraniční 
styky a informace–ÚZSI), a civilian agency responsible for foreign 
intelligence; 
• The Security Information Service (Bezpečnostní informační služba–BIS), 
a civilian counter-intelligence agency; 
• The Military Defensive Intelligence (Vojenské obranné zpravodajství–VOZ), 
a military counter-intelligence agency; 
• The Military Intelligence Service (Vojenská zpravodajská služba–VZS), the 
intelligence agency of the ACR.  
Organization structures and tasks of the above listed services have changed 
slightly since then. Their core responsibilities are summarized in the following section. 
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1. Services, Tasks, Cooperation, and Oversight 
 
The organizations and tasks of the Czech intelligence and counter-intelligence 
services are somewhat different from those in the USA, for example. Yet, the basic 
functions remain similar throughout the world—what usually differs is the actual 
numbers, subordination, flow of information, and oversight. In order to provide for 
a broader frame into which to fit OSINT later on, one should first understand the 
organization and main tasks of the Czech intelligence and counter-intelligence services.  
 
Military Intelligence (VZ): In 1994 the Military Defense Intelligence (VOZ) and 
the Military Intelligence Service (VZS) were formally amalgamated into the Military 
Intelligence (Vojenské zpravodajství–VZ) through Law No. 153, or "intelligence bill" 
(ZZS 1994). But the two segments of the VZ practically work independently, even 
though a certain level of cooperation has been attained. While the former reports directly 
to the Minister of Defense, the latter is subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff. 
The subordination is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Subordination of the Military Intelligence Services 
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In accordance with law, "the Military Intelligence (VZ) provides the following 
information: 
(1) Information about intentions and activities that represent military threats to the 
Czech Republic. 
(2) Information about foreign military intelligence services. 
(3) Information about intentions and activities directed against the assurance of 
the defense of the Czech Republic. 
(4) Information about activities endangering state and service secrets related to 
the defense of the Czech Republic." (ZZS 1994) 
The VZS has full responsibility for the first item in the above list. The other three 
items are mainly under the jurisdiction of the VOZ; however, the VZS participates in 
those tasks when gaining relevant information abroad. Moreover, the VZS not only 
fulfills the tasks of the military intelligence but also functions as the J-2 branch, being 
responsible for the military reconnaissance and electronic warfare at the strategic level. 
 
Security Information Service (BIS): The Security Information Service (BIS) has 
probably been the most "torn and twisted" service since it represents a domestic 
intelligence bureau. As such, considering the very negative reputation the former 
totalitarian state secret police (State Security, or StB) earned, the BIS leadership has been 
under severe pressure from both the politicians and the public. Notwithstanding 
accusations of being politicized, the BIS is also known for numerous cases of misconduct 
among its members. Yet, one should be aware that the BIS lacks sufficient human and 
material resources while having to tackle a wide variety of tasks. 
According to law, the BIS provides information: 
• About intentions and activities, such as political extremism and subversive 
actions, aimed against the democratic institutions, sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity of the Czech Republic; 
• About foreign intelligence services; 
• About activities compromising state and service secrets; 
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• About activities endangering the security or important economic interests of 
the Czech Republic, such as corruption, money laundering, WMD and arms 
proliferation, and so on; 
• About organized crime and terrorism. 
Although successful and publicly praised in some cases, the BIS is often cited for 
its insufficient coverage of foreign espionage and organized crime. An enormous 
turnover in personnel is probably the most serious cause of such problems.  
 
Bureau for Foreign Contacts and Information (ÚZSI): According to its vague 
mandate, the Bureau for Foreign Contacts and Information (ÚZSI) provides for 
"information originating abroad important for the security and protection of the foreign-
policy and economic interests of the Czech Republic." (ZZS 1994) The ÚZSI studies 
global risks, such as terrorism, extremism, proliferation, drugs and arms dealing. The 
activities of the ÚZSI and its intelligence productivity remain close to the public. Yet, it 
is known that, owing to the shutdown of espionage after 1989, the ÚZSI has continued to 
work largely from open sources and via liaison officers abroad. 
  
Interagency Cooperation: Cooperation among the services is based upon inter-
agency agreements that the government must approve. Moreover, each agency can 
exchange information with its foreign counterparts and other services if approved by the 
government. Statistics, related to the amount of cooperation among different services, if 
any exist at all, are not publicized. Probably the largest amount of information is 
exchanged between the BIS and the police, owing to the fact that both services cooperate 
closely in combating corruption, organized crime, and terrorism. As for the Military 
Intelligence (VZ), its two parts, the VZS and the VOZ, have connected with tens of 
intelligence and security agencies and also integrated into the intelligence system of the 
NATO Allied Command in Europe (ACE). 
 
Direction, Reporting, and Oversight: The President and the government task 
intelligence services in accordance to their respective functional areas. The Czech 
government coordinates all the services via its permanent Intelligence Committee and 
55 
bears the responsibility for the services' activities. Practically, all the services except for 
the BIS are subordinated to a ministry. The director of the ÚZSI reports to the Minister of 
Interior and the director of the VZ is subordinated to the Minister of Defense. The 
director of the BIS, however, answers to the entire government. The subordination of the 
ÚZSI and BIS are not what one would normally expect but rather a result of the mistrust 
of domestic intelligence. 
All the services prepare and submit their annual reports to the President, the 
government, and their respective ministers.  
As to the parliamentary oversight, the Parliament exercises direct oversight only 
over the two counter-intelligence agencies—BIS and VOZ. However, the Intelligence 
Committee advises the Parliament of the activities of all the intelligence services on 
a regular basis. 
 
2. Current Military Intelligence Requirements 
 
Since the Czech Republic gained its independence, both politicians and the public 
have perceived the defense planning and especially the role of military intelligence as 
entirely theoretical. Unlike Poland or Hungary, where instability in the former USSR 
states or the Balkan crisis continues to shape the states' defense policies, the geographical 
location of the Czech Republic, its succession to NATO, and the absence of a direct 
threat make the country highly unlikely to be threatened militarily. The hypothetical 
threats from Germany and Russia would endanger the Czech Republic's sovereignty, but 
such threats are very unlikely to occur. More likely, the Czech Republic can be involved 
in regional, border, or internal conflicts that will not affect the country so radically. 
Fortunately, the Czech Republic security establishment sees the NATO and European 
security and economic institutions as sufficient tools to deal with such conflicts 
effectively. Finally, a conflict with Slovakia also seems to be extremely unlikely, for no 
serious border or minority problems have occurred since the split in 1993. 
 
Although the probability of a direct military attack against the Czech Republic has 
been significantly reduced and is unlikely in the near future, military attacks cannot be 
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ruled out completely. Indeed, the most probable threats in the foreseeable future are 
organized crime, terrorism, and waves of refugees; such problems may cause internal 
instability and unrest. Especially terrorism or international crime may infiltrate the Czech 
Republic—and being endangered by a force of such a magnitude the country may need 
the military to eliminate the threat.  
In practice, the shift to non-military and semi-military threats and risks has 
changed the intelligence requirements. The VZS, although still tasked to assess 
traditional military targets, is becoming more and more involved in providing intelligence 
about other non-military topics as well. The following briefly covers the areas that 
deserve the attention of the military intelligence. 
 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: The threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) has not been totally eliminated. The expanding group of 
entities with these weapons or attempting to acquire them is particularly disturbing. 
These entities are often states with non-democratic and unstable regimes. It is especially 
dangerous when individuals or non-state entities control weapons of mass destruction, 
whatever the quantity, however few. Intelligence predicts a significant risk of such an 
encounter within the next few years. 
Traditional actors may also pose significant danger to the global security. The 
chance of war between India and Pakistan is now greater then ever in the last three 
decades. Although both states are publicly downgrading the risk of nuclear conflict, 
a conventional war could escalate into a nuclear confrontation. Iraq's regime continues to 
restore its military force and to fund its pursuit of WMD, despite its own positive 
diplomatic efforts toward the UN and neighboring states. Furthermore, NATO states can 
face threats from the inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that exist or that are 
being developed in North Korea, Iran and Iraq. 
When developing advanced weapons, WMD proliferators build upon the 
experience of others and take advantage of the dual-use nature of WMD-related 
technologies. For example, networks of fictive companies and organizations help conceal 
the transfer of radioactive materials, coming to the Czech Republic mostly from the 
former Soviet Union. Many chemical and biological weapon (CBW) facilities are hidden 
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in plants that are very hard to distinguish from genuine commercial sites. Unlike nuclear 
or chemical weapons, bacteriological weapons can be constructed in very small 
laboratories within a few days. That is why all WMD transfers, including delivery means, 
special components, and production technology are one of the main concerns of the 
intelligence services in all democratic countries.  
 
Terrorism: Count de Marenches, former head of the French intelligence services, 
insisted that the Cold War was really World War III, and that World War IV is now under 
way, full of new enemies. He predicted in 1992: “The Fourth World War will be 
a terrorist war.” (Marenches and Andelman 1992) Unfortunately, he seems to be right 
and the recent tragic events of September 11, 2001 have confirmed his prediction.  
Domestic unrest and political, religious, or ethnic conflicts in weak states are 
factors conductive to terrorism. The problems terrorists exploit—poverty, alienation, and 
ethnic tensions—are estimated to increase over this decade. The world's poorest and most 
politically unstable regions in Asia and Africa will have the largest youth population in 
the near future, expanding the recruiting potential for extremist groups.  
Intelligence services generally fear that not only conventional explosives but also 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons could be used as a means of blackmailing the 
government or international organizations. Terrorist groups have ready access to 
information on WMD via open sources, especially the Internet.  
So far, the Czech Republic has not been a terrorist target. Although over two 
hundred explosions have been recorded since 1990, all the cases were labeled as the work 
of amateurs without detectable political motives. Yet, adversarial groups or individuals 
may use the Czech Republic as a base for attacks in other states, or they can attack 
Czech-based institutions, such as embassies or the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in 
Prague. In general, terrorists can target high-profile government facilities, famous 
landmarks, and infrastructure nodes, such as airports, bridges, and dams. To stop or 
prevent such attacks is enormously difficult, and the intelligence services play an 
exclusive role when collecting and analyzing information on the intentions and 
movements of terrorist groups and individuals.  
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In a number of regions, Islamic fundamental terrorism in particular is already 
a frequent and dangerous phenomenon. The region closest to the Czech Republic that is 
important to the military intelligence is the Balkan Peninsula. Furthermore, worldwide 
organizations, such as Al-Qa'ida, Hamas, Hizballah, and others that have already planned 
and successfully accomplished various strikes against allied targets in Europe and must 
be monitored attentively.  
 
Information Warfare:13 High performance electronic information systems have 
created global network cyberspace. Not only were corporate businesses and governments 
able to attain high technology, but also tens of millions of individuals suddenly within 
less than a decade gained tools and capabilities, which had been previously limited to 
a selected few. Today, many state and local governmental organizations are establishing 
a presence on the Internet. Also, thousands of private agencies are reachable via online 
information services. That has radically complicated what intelligence agencies had to 
face in the past into something very complex now, and which will be even more 
troublesome in the future. 
The Czech military often depends on civilian information networks. Most of the 
peacetime military communications, for example, travel over the same phone networks 
used to fax a contract or to talk with a friend. Also, the national electric power grid 
powers military and police bases. Purchases for military organizations are paid via the 
commercial banking network. People from national security organizations are transported 
under the guidance of civilian rail and air traffic control systems. Each of these 
information or transportation nodes creates a substantial vulnerability for the military in 
a crisis.  
Today, one who controls information controls people. Relying on information 
systems presents an attractive but two-sided opportunity—intelligence can use 
information systems effectively to gain, store, and retrieve information but adversaries 
can also attack such systems. Such development has created the information war. An 
                                                 
13 Although some authors see information warfare (IW) more as a combat arm, it definitely 
represents a highly topical issue for the military intelligence. However, the extent of IW is so wide that it 
exceeds the scope of this thesis. To better understand IW and its relation to terrorism and organized crime, 
see the works of Arquilla, Denning, Ronfeldt, and Schwartau.  
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information war has no front line. The potential battlefields are anywhere networked 
systems allow access. Information warfare is a low-budget, high-tech vehicle for mass 
destruction. (Schwartau 1996) Indeed, cyber terrorists attack information networks 
relatively cheaply already. 
 
Organized Crime: Offenses such as arms proliferation, smuggling, computer 
crime, drug trafficking and other crimes directly impact the Czech Republic citizens and 
economy, regardless of their origin. The democratic development and still primitive tools 
for maintaining security in the Czech Republic are attractive targets for criminal 
activities. Transnational organized crime is currently the greatest imperilment. The Czech 
Republic is attractive both as a market and a transit route due to the weaknesses in its 
legal, policing and judicial structures. The political, social, and economic changes 
occurring in Eastern Europe and in the former USSR have provided significant, 
unintended opportunities for organized crime and criminal enterprises. Illegal syndicates 
set up their underground networks for illegal migration, drug trafficking, and arms 
proliferation.  
Criminal organizations operating in the Czech Republic come mainly from the 
countries of the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, together with 
those from Italy and Southeast Asia. For example, Asian criminals, especially 
Vietnamese, have been involved in organizing illegal migration and smuggling goods. 
Arabian, Yugoslav and Albanian groups concentrate on drugs and deal in arms. Well-
organized criminals from Russia, Ukraine, Chechnya, and the former Yugoslavia are 
becoming more aggressive and are typically involved in criminal violence. The groups 
from the former USSR are now the most active, merging with various illegal groups that 
operate internationally. 
As to the illegal migration, refugees crossing Czech borders in recent years 
decreased because of improvements in Kosovo. Yet, the number of fugitives from other 
parts of Europe and Asia increased. Some foreigners do not legalize their residence in the 
Czech Republic and participate in various criminal activities. Their arrival and residence 
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is mostly planned and conducted by internationally organized groups.14 Indeed, illegal 
migration is moving mostly from the East and Southeast to Germany. Statistical data 
confirm that the Czech Republic remains a transit country for fugitives on route to 
Western Europe (Zpráva 2000). 
Narcotics and drug proliferation is another threat that spreads across borders. The 
narcotics have become a global problem that is likely to rise dramatically in the Czech 
Republic in the next few years. Statistics on illicit drug consumption in the Czech 
Republic15 indicate that drug use and drug trafficking is on the rise. The Czech military 
has not participated in any particular anti-drug operation so far; however, the ACR should 
not exclude the possibility of being involved in a larger anti-narcotic operation. 
Illegal trade in arms and explosives has remained almost constant recently. 
Criminal groups illegally sell and purchase explosives, weapons, and ammunition with no 
identification marks, frequently offered on the black market.  
 
Economy: We traditionally tend to think in either military or economic terms, 
instead of recognizing the synergy of the two and treating them as a single concept. The 
collection strategies of adversaries and allies alike will not only focus on defense-related 
information but will also focus on scientific, technological, political, and economic 
information. Misinformation, blackmailing, destruction, or other means of economic 
disruption must be anticipated. From a military perspective, economic vulnerability of 
well-developed countries as well as the economy of potential adversaries should be 
                                                 
14 In 2000, 32,720 persons were apprehended while illegally crossing the national borders; 94% 
of them—30,761 persons—were foreigners. Most were from Romania, Afghanistan, Moldavia, Sri Lanka, 
India, Ukraine, and Bulgaria (Zpráva 2000). 
15 Estimated numbers of consumers (based on the demand side) for the year 2000 were as 
follows: 
• Marijuana and hashish: 250,000 consumers 
• Pervitin (a Czech-made, ephedrine-based synthetic drug): 22,500 consumers 
• Heroin: 15,000 consumers 
• LSD: 6,540 consumers 
• Ecstasy: 5,820 consumers. 
Illicit drug consumption totaled 0.8% of the GDP. Note: According to researchers, the numbers are 
probably underestimated due to very insufficient data collection, particularly in the case of Ecstasy 
(SANANIM 2002) . 
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considered when providing intelligence to commanders and policymakers because 
economy plays a very important part in a country's development. 
 
 
C. OSINT IN THE CZECH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 
 
In the age of information, intelligence is less a matter of penetrating secrets, and 
more a matter of extracting useful information from the flood of open information that is 
legally and cheaply available. The single most significant step an intelligence 
organization can take to increase the value of the information it acquires is to increase the 
speed with which the information is acquired and acted upon (Steele 1993). Yet, this 
would not be enough. As explained in the previous chapter, information is just a middle 
part of the pyramid—even if information is timely and accurate, it has no value unless it 
is used to create, distribute and use knowledge in decision-making processes.  
 
The Czech military intelligence must react to the enormous impact open sources 
and information systems have on all aspect of intelligence dealings. The VZS can 
differentiate itself not solely by what collection assets it has at its disposal or how much 
or how little money it spends, but rather on the basis of what its people know. The author 
believes that OSINT, built on the knowledge management principles is a useful concept 
that can meet the consumers' needs. Some older practitioners may consider the concept 
revolutionary—but it is actually rather an incremental step that should be taken to 
manage open sources properly, using the advantages of modern information technology.  
Indeed, the thesis will not provide a full analysis and a complex solution for 
OSINT knowledge management in the military intelligence—this is not a task for one 
person and a few months of research. However, by focusing on the challenges that should 
be considered, the four stages of the knowledge system and process design used in this 
section will help explain the role of OSINT in the Czech military intelligence. The 
section identifies target knowledge that can be acquired via OSINT, analyzes current 
OSINT procedures, and also identifies processes that must be addressed in future OSINT 
development. The section targets the Military Intelligence Service (VZS) in particular; 
62 
however, when appropriate, generalizations are made to express the broader applicability 
of the knowledge system and process design. 
 
1. Process Analysis 
 
In this first stage of the knowledge system and process design, attention is paid to 
objectives and strategies of the ACR in order to identify the knowledge that OSINT can 
attain and the VZS can manage. The OSINT system must not be built without 
understanding the tasks of the VZS; for each process, the knowledge that can ensure an 
effective performance must be defined. 
 
First of all, the VZS serves as a decision-making tool for the strategic military 
commander, namely the Chief of the General Staff. Although some daily practices may 
suggest otherwise, the VZS is an organization that must provide military related 
intelligence—its first and foremost role. This role implies that the VZS builds its 
knowledge base upon the objectives and strategies of the ACR. 
The objectives and strategies of the ACR have already been introduced in the 
previous sections. Now, combining the potential security threats and risks with the 
principal tasks of the ACR, the use of the Armed Forces is summarized into two main 
categories, each of which comprises a subset of probable tasks: 
a) Inside the Territory of the Czech Republic: The ACR can be employed in the 
case of a threat or a risk that may have a direct impact inside the Czech Republic. 
The ACR may be particularly engaged to counter:  
• Acts of the international organized crime of larger extent, such as 
proliferation of arms or weapons of mass destruction (WMD), drug 
trafficking, and extended communication and computer network attacks; 
• Terrorist activities, either intended or realized; 
• Immigration waves of a large magnitude; 
• Natural disasters or technological accidents.  
b) Outside the Territory of the Czech Republic: The ACR can be involved in 
military and non-military activities to prevent or to counter possible threats that 
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may have both direct and indirect impact on Czech or European security. Most 
likely, Czech troops will not act outside their territory on their own but rather 
under the umbrella of the UN or NATO operations, or as a part of the CESDP 
rapid reaction forces. The ACR may be employed in: 
• NATO operations, either under the Article 5 or in non-Article-5 
operations; 
• UN-lead peace-support operations; 
• UN/EU humanitarian missions of various nature; 
• Actions realized under bilateral and multilateral military cooperation, such 
as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, military exercises, on-demand 
expertise, and so on. 
One can easily see that most of the above mentioned tasks are of a non-combat or 
semi-military nature, although the military engages its combat assets during those 
missions and the possibility of direct combat cannot be excluded. Operations may not 
necessarily be waged against single and easily recognizable foes.  
 
The ACR will likely participate in the missions abroad more frequently than 
engage inside the country. Intelligence needs for such missions seem to be relatively 
straightforward, considering the contemporary dynamic mode of operations. At the 
strategic level, there will generally be less need to discover the intention of an aggression, 
as in such cases the adverse activities will already be occurring. But the VZS will 
certainly need to gain and to use knowledge related to the local political situation, culture, 
demographics, terrain, weather, infrastructure, and composition and deployment of 
hostile and friendly forces. In some cases, such as WMD industry issues or technological 
disasters, very specific knowledge and expertise may be required.  
U.S Ambassador Kimmit's requirement of the intelligence "an inch deep and 
a mile wide, with the ability to go a mile deep on any given issue" is certainly valid for 
the VZS as well. Yet, there is probably no intelligence organization in the world that is 
able to manage such a requirement solely on its own. That applies to the VZS in 
particular, knowing the limitations and circumstances under which the organization 
operates.  
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2. Knowledge Analysis 
 
This second stage of the knowledge system and process design results from the 
previous analysis. In this part, the analysis concentrates on identifying the knowledge that 
is needed within the VZS.  
When asked, the top VZS management confirmed that the service is now more 
involved in non-military topics than in traditional military subjects. As foreshadowed in 
the second chapter, the VZS simply cannot use only its own secret collection and 
analytical assets to cover the customers' needs—and neither can it acquire the required 
knowledge through OSINT itself. In all issues, OSINT must function as the first instance, 
as a broad knowledge base and as a knowledge gap filler.  
Let's now have a brief look at the knowledge that can be build via OSINT and 
what purpose it may serve. 
 
Warning: Military commanders and defense policy-makers will always be 
concerned about strategic warning. OSINT can provide a sufficient base for monitoring 
events that can potentially endanger the nation's existence, focusing on three main 
issues—nuclear attack, conventional attack, and unconventional developments.  
As already mentioned, the nature of nuclear attack has changed. Arms reduction 
and the close monitoring of traditional nuclear powers, such as Russia or Kazakhstan, 
have been effective. On the other hand, the growing list of other nuclear-capable states 
consists of many unstable regimes whose interests and policies are contentious to those of 
the Czech Republic and its allies.  
Conventional attack warning will probably remain an everlasting concern for the 
military intelligence, maybe even more so when the nuclear threat has diminished. 
Possible forward force deployments and military engagements in crisis regions is the 
reason for a continuous "intelligence watch."   
Insurgencies, terrorist incidents, humanitarian crisis, and so on represent 
unconventional developments. The ACR and its allies will likely be encountering such 
developments more frequently. The Balkan situation, for example, represents an area of 
uncertain Czech policy interests but definitely continues to have the potential for 
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humanitarian crisis or other disasters. Instability in Central Asia threatens gradually to 
involve many regional powers, such as Russia, Turkey, China, Iran, India, and Pakistan. 
These developments, however, can be sufficiently monitored using open source news 
alerts and similar expert services. Also, non-state actors that use terrorism as "cheap 
warfare" frequently come from revolutionary, sectarian, and extremist religious groups, 
knowledge of which can frequently be through OSINT. Similarly, the VZS will mostly 
turn to open sources when seeking for knowledge related to international crime.  
  
Peace Keeping/Peace Enforcement Operations (PKO/PEO): Kuwait, former 
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan—what will be next? For many years, Czech military units and 
individuals participated in peacekeeping operations; yet the military intelligence 
supporting those in the peacekeeping missions remains far from ideal. The intelligence 
support must not be aimed only at the top political-military command, i.e. the Ministry of 
Defense and the General Staff, but also at the troops in the field. Indeed, as both the VZS 
and the military units gained experience with the PKO/PEO, the situation has improved 
since the Persian Gulf War. However, the national intelligence support to the troops in 
the field is not systematic yet. OSINT can provide far more than narrow secure 
intelligence channels because it has the advantage of unlimited distribution and sharing. 
The military intelligence elements detached to support the peacekeeping forces also 
need—besides the traditional intelligence on orders of battle or weapons and 
equipment—detailed information about ethnic and religious groups, belligerent leaders, 
political parties and factions, military and civilian infrastructure, social structure, 
humanitarian needs, and so on. Obviously, not only military intelligence personnel but 
also every soldier on the field has a part in OSINT for the PKO/PEO.  
 
Technology Proliferation and Arms Control: The issue of technology proliferation 
relates to both military and non-military technology and has become very complex. 
Military proliferation includes WMD, conventional systems, as well as support systems, 
such as command-control-communication-computer-intelligence systems (C4I), and 
associated technologies. The Military Intelligence Service (VZS) will have to keep up 
with the expanding transnational flow of subject-related knowledge. Fortunately, much of 
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what is needed is available from the open academic and industrial sources; yet preserving 
and upgrading relevant knowledge will be very challenging, should the VZS continue to 
track the flow of technologies and knowledge. The interchangeability of technological 
application between military and commercial sectors and the transnational nature of 
technology proliferation further complicate this issue. 
 
Other Transnational Issues: Natural disasters, population dislocations, epidemics, 
environmental pollution, and similar uncontrolled large-scale problems can exacerbate 
regional instability; so the military intelligence will be tasked to focus on such issues 
should it become the concern of political leaders and military commanders. 
Large numbers of people have become displaced economically or as a result of 
ethnic and religious conflicts in the former Soviet republics, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, 
and other places. These people move to the political and economical refuges of Western 
Europe and North America where the receiving countries experience pressures in terms 
of social services, housing, and increased ethnic dissension. The Czech Republic is 
embroiled in this pressure as it frequently serves as a transit country.  
Significant health problems result from mass starvation and epidemics of diseases 
such as AIDS. Also, older forms of diseases, such as tuberculosis are reemerging owing 
to the recent conflicts in the Balkans, Chechnya, and other places and to uncontrolled 
migration.  
Environmental concerns, such as hazardous waste disposal and the safety of 
nuclear power plants have also become important, being exemplified by the Chernobyl 
disaster or by the gradual destruction of most of the drinking water supply in Russia.  
Photographic intelligence assets or other parts of the military intelligence may be 
tasked to contribute when a nation tackles the above-listed problems. Indeed, if it were 
tasked to provide intelligence on these issues, the VZS could not manage required 
knowledge without a connection to the outside open-source world.  
 
Central to this part of the knowledge system and process design is identifying and 
analyzing critical success factors (CSFs)—activities that must be performed effectively 
in order for the mission to succeed. The CSFs must be in harmony with the organization's 
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core competency, namely providing intelligence for military commanders and other 
intelligence customers. The VZS may need a detailed study of its own tasks and 
capabilities to identify what knowledge is crucial to assess performance in the VZS' 
organizational setting and context. After the study is conducted, each of the factors 
should be separately evaluated as a single-target process. Using pre-defined configuration 
measurements, an existing configuration must be diagnosed in terms of process 
pathologies to determine how well does the existing process meet the desired goal. The 
diagnosis then helps eliminate the pathologies from the process.  
 
3. Context Analysis 
 
In this phase of the knowledge system and process design, knowledge—
particularly the tacit knowledge possessed by specialists—stemming from OSINT should 
be captured. Once captured, the VZS can use information systems and other software 
applications to organize, to formalize, and to distribute the knowledge.  
 
Organizational knowledge starts with individuals. The VZ must first recognize the 
knowledge its members possess, capture it, share it throughout the organization, and 
reuse it. In this way, the members amplify the knowledge and internalize it as a part of 
the organization's knowledge base. The management must be aware that intellectual 
capital is the most valuable asset. Collection tools and modern IT can acquire, process, 
and share information—but the knowledge of employees, experts outside the VZ, and the 
consumers of intelligence is what must be fostered and leveraged most. Managing 
knowledge is much more than merely storing and manipulating data—managing 
knowledge also recognizes the human assets that can be accessed and used by those who 
make decisions.  
Without understanding the nature and organization of knowledge, the military 
intelligence personnel can hardly be effective in OSINT. An intelligence analyst, for 
example, may be both the seeker and provider of open-source knowledge in some cases. 
When solving a problem, the analyst can reach a point when further knowledge is 
required. The same analyst then can identify, capture, and organize the knowledge 
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needed. In other situations, analysts will outsource this knowledge work when they lack 
the time, propensity, or ability to do it by themselves. Then, the analyst will just use 
knowledge delivered by the provider. And this example is valid virtually for all 
knowledge workers, whether they solve intelligence requirements or daily routine work. 
 
The VZS should develop knowledge maps to identify who possesses what kind of 
knowledge, both inside and outside the organizational structure. In order to build 
a foundation of open-source knowledge, the VZS must create "yellow pages" and 
knowledge maps of military and civilian experts and analysts. To accomplish this, first 
the organization's internal documents, the Intranet, databases, and directories must be 
carefully studied to identify and capture the OSINT knowledge already existing inside the 
VZS. Then, virtual network organizations, research and development (R&D) centers, 
librarians, annual reports and conference proceedings, association directories, and many 
more sources can and should be mapped to create maps of knowledge existing outside the 
VZS' organizational structure and to identify how this knowledge can be reached. 
This whole procedure will certainly take much effort and time. Yet, it is probably 
the only systematic way to identify existing open-source knowledge and capture it. It will 
also help to find if any overlaps or inefficiencies exist in the extant or generated OSINT 
system and process design.  
 
4. Systems Analysis 
 
In this final stage of the knowledge system and process design, the organization's 
current procedures and information systems are briefly analyzed. First, the organizational 
design is surveyed. Then, controlling strategies and the information-flow configurations 
are summarized. Finally, the analysis basically follows the six phases of the knowledge 
management life cycle (KMLC), describing each particular phase in terms of extant 
procedures and practices within the VZS. Personal conversation and a written 
questionnaire16 were used to expand the author's personal experience with the VZS. 
                                                 
16 The sample consisted of ten VZS employees. Five of them were analysts; the other five were 
supervisors. 
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More detailed process and systems analysis is certainly desired, should the future 
knowledge design for OSINT be developed. However, the following paragraphs convey 
basic ideas about the VZS' organization, procedures and practices.  
 
Organizational Design: A contingency model (Jansen et al 2000) is used to 
determine the current organization type of the VZS. The model explains the reason 
a specific form of knowledge management may or may not work in the OSINT. Here, the 
model is used to identify the whole organization; however, it will be useful to apply it to 
multiple VZS levels.  
The contingency model uses four general strategies for knowledge management 
that differ from one another as to complexity and variability of the organizational 
environment. The model and the position of the VZS are depicted in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Four Strategies for Knowledge Management and the VZS 
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The current organizational design of the VZS and its information and 
communication technology does not exactly fit any of the four illustrated types. While the 
organization's structure evidently has some elements of the division into business 
functions, in some parts the VZS reveals existing domains of expertise. Table 1 
summarizes the main characteristics of the extant organizational design and IT. 
 
Organizational Type Organizational Design IT and Communication 
Division into Business 
Functions 
• Centralization 
• Staff Organs 
• Rules and Procedures 
• Separate Departments 
• Formal, Central 
Information System 
Focused on Compilation 
and Retrieval 
• Intranet 
Division into Domains 
• Separate Knowledge 
Domains 
• Individual Knowledge 
Levels 
• Group Knowledge Levels 
• Generally Accessible 
Information System 
• Newsgroups and 
Bulletin Boards within 
Some of the Knowledge 
Domains 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Extant Organizational Design and IT in the VZS 
 
 
Dividing existent knowledge into business functions is mostly used in situations 
that are neither complex nor dynamic, and the organization does not actually create 
knowledge but frequently uses and refines it. Although this is not the case, the 
organization of the VZS is divided into separate functional departments and sections. The 
knowledge is also concentrated in the minds of individuals and very small, enclosed 
information entities. This is definitely a concept of the past when the required knowledge 
was clearly defined and this functional form was effective. However, this approach is still 
valid when existent knowledge must become explicit and when individuals want to use 
the knowledge. 
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Dividing knowledge into domains or areas of expertise is characteristic by 
dividing activities into different professional domains. Specialists for limited areas of 
expertise have the appropriate knowledge at their disposal; and the VZS management 
often uses these specialists to solve complex problems by creating ad hoc teams or cross-
functional projects. The knowledge is used; the focus stays more on the application of 
implicit knowledge that the experts possess, rather than on knowledge content or 
knowledge creation. 
It is no wonder that, in practice, the VZS has to adapt its organizational character 
and alter the strategy of knowledge work. The dynamics of information environment and 
variable requirements do not fit the military hierarchy well. Today, the adaptations are 
merely a passive reaction to the disordered outside environment. But the VZS should 
actively decide to choose a different path and should become an organization that creates 
knowledge, making it a more virtual, project-oriented enterprise. OSINT is the foremost 
arena where such a shift is possible.  
 
Controlling Strategies and Information Flow: The existing organizational 
structure of the VZS, with its vertically oriented control, fully reflects the traditional 
military hierarchy. A simplified version of controlling and collaborating is illustrated in 
Figure 8. The structure of the VZS is formally built to let knowledge flow up while 
controlling its distribution down. However, the incoherent changes in the outer dynamic 
environment often force the organization's elements to collaborate in the horizontal 
directions, both formally and informally. The two functions of the VZS, i.e. the function 
of the defense intelligence agency and the function of the strategic directorate for 
reconnaissance and collection have created organizational difficulties, supporting 




After the succession to NATO, the Czech military adopted a formal model of the 
NATO intelligence cycle in order to meet standardization requirements; however, the 
organizational structure and intelligence procedures have not fully reflected the 
standardized collection coordination and information requirements management 
(CCIRM) model. To amalgamate the existing structure and standardized intelligence 
procedures, the VZS uses the following CCIRM system, illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
Extant Procedures and Practices: Using Nonaka's interaction modes between tacit 
and explicit knowledge, one can begin to study how every organization creates, 
organizes, and formalizes its organizational knowledge. The possible interaction modes 
are illustrated in Figure 10. 
Figure 8. Controlling and Collaboration in the VZS 
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Although tacit knowledge held by individuals is the core of the knowledge 
creating process, full benefits can be obtained only when dynamic interaction occur 
through all possible modes—tacit to tacit, tacit to explicit, explicit to tacit, and explicit to 
explicit. As to the military intelligence, the actual intensity of the possible interaction 
modes is expressed by the thickness of the arrows. Most interactions are realized through 
the explicit channels, such as written orders and requirements, intelligence working 
papers, manuals, database exchange, or electronic communication. Then interaction also 
occurs between the tacit and explicit nodes, probably more in the direction from the 
explicit form to the human recipients. And the smallest portion of knowledge is actually 
Figure 9. Collection Coordination and Information Requirements Management 
in the VZS 
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exchanged through human-to-human communication, despite the fact that the tacit 
knowledge is probably the most important part of the organizational knowledge base, as 
already stressed.  
To further quantify how often the VZS personnel uses each of the four modes of 
knowledge interaction, the representative sample of the VZS employees has been 
questioned.  The following graphs express how often they interact with different forms of 
open sources.17 Graph 1 represents domestic sources; Graph 2 illustrates the situation 
with sources abroad.  
The knowledge created or captured in the OSINT seems to be based more on 
media and databases than on person-to-person contacts. This may be a result of many 
factors, such as source availability, language barriers, or budgetary restrictions. Further 
study will be definitely advantageous to future knowledge managers in the VZS. 
                                                 
17 The frequency of use was graded as follows: 0—Never; 1—Seldom (at least once a year); 2—
Occassionally (at least once a month); 3—Frequently (every week); 4—The most often (daily). 
Figure 10. Military Intelligence and Knowledge Interaction Modes 
75 
As to the phase of knowledge formalization, the formalization of the knowledge 
does not occur systematically and regularly throughout the VZS. As the collected open-
source data and information allow for creating new knowledge, this knowledge is 
frequently directly used during the intelligence process. To the author's best knowledge, 
the VZS has not yet employed any knowledge-based system (KBS) that could serve as 
a means to formalize open-source knowledge inside the organization. Existing 
information system is oriented toward information storage and exchange and can hardly 
serve to knowledge formalization. This is mainly because knowledge formalization 
requires that the knowledge management system be designed after the nature of 
knowledge itself is analyzed—not before or without such analysis. Unfortunately, 
intelligence managers and IT people often believe that a computer network can store 
human intelligence and experience. 
 
Graph 1. Frequency of the Use of Domestic Open Sources 
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The formalization of knowledge also bears one negative aspect when it comes to 
the final fusion and production of the all-source intelligence. During the all-source 
analysis, the job of selecting and using appropriate knowledge is done twice—first, for 
open-source information, and then again with classified information. Current security 
apparatus is very restrictive as to channeling both classified and unclassified data into the 
same workstation. An extant information system does not allow automated merging of 
these two, owing to inadequate security measures. Data storage for classified data has 
evolved in a closed internal system, which is connected only to external systems of the 
same classification. This is certainly positive in terms of intrusion and computer attacks; 
however, it creates many "roadblocks" to all-source intelligence production.18 
 
                                                 
18 Most interviewees estimated that the VZS uses 30-50% of open sources for all-source 
intelligence.   
Graph 2. Frequency of the Use of Foreign Open Sources 
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Distribution of knowledge both inside and outside the VZS is problematic, too. 
Knowledge based on classified information has its own specific distribution problems, as 
already foreshadowed. Knowledge based on open sources can be distributed freely; yet it 
seems as though all the information distributed and all the knowledge shared is tainted 
with the principle "need to know"—even unclassified information had to be registered 
until two years ago.  
Estimated 75% to 80% of information is distributed on paper. As the existing 
electronic system does not provide for sufficient knowledge formalization, it cannot 
allow for knowledge sharing either. Printed lessons learned, handbooks, and intelligence 
manuals do exist; but they do not count for a significant part of the existing 
organizational knowledge. 
 
It has been already stressed that knowledge should help individuals and 
organizations make decisions. In the VZS, the knowledge is applied mostly within the 
minds of individuals based upon the information set that is available at the moment. The 
knowledge base, which would help form one's decisions, does not exist. The OSINT 
center of the VZS has been redesigned recently, however, it seems to be established upon 
the traditional assumption—that OSINT is merely a counterpart, rather than a base, for 
secret collection. It is assumed that compiling data and information in a central repository 
can ensure that everyone with an access to the repository is capable of and willing to use 
it. This assumption is not valid. Most managers—the VZS not excluding—make 
decisions based on their interaction with others who they account knowledgeable about 
the issues. That does not signify that those accounted for the knowledge by managers are 
really the most knowledgeable persons. Without proper knowledge management, it is 
likely that managers will judge one's knowledge merely on one's glibness rather than on 
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IV. ADAPTING KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT THEORY TO THE 
CZECH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
Knowledge work is the core business of the military intelligence. As stressed 
beforehand, knowledge work is not limited to the VZS; virtually all organizations across 
all the governmental and private sectors are becoming knowledge intensive (Drucker 
1994). The Czech military cannot avoid this development; the Czech military must rather 
adapt to it. Today, the massive flow of open-source information overwhelms the 
traditional collection and analysis system that the military intelligence uses. Information 
is lost or wasted and even critically important information, when acquired, is not always 
turned into "corporate" knowledge. To achieve a working synthesis of IT and different 
knowledge domains, OSINT requires multi-disciplinary expertise, collaboration, and 
mutual learning. New models, leadership commitment, and new ways of thinking are 
needed. 
This chapter outlines the main aspects of the OSINT knowledge system and 
process design for the Czech military. The first section presents the major steps to 
building knowledge management, focusing on the main areas to which the Czech 
military, particularly the VZS, should pay attention when designing its future OSINT. 
Then the second section of the chapter discusses the objectives and limitations of the 
OSINT process and system design. Finally, the last section encapsulates the OSINT 




A. MAJOR STEPS TO BUILDING OSINT KNOWLEDGE-MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM 
 
Introducing knowledge management into the existing OSINT environment of the 
VZS is a long-term task that should be built in incremental steps. Karl Wiig (1999) 
introduced sixteen building blocks that should be considered for introducing a new 
knowledge management practice. Based on his work, the following section describes 
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seven basic steps in their approximate order of implementation that the VZS should take 
when designing its OSINT knowledge-management system.  
 
Management Commitment: Management commitment is essential for all the 
knowledge management efforts. Knowledge management champions among the top VZS 
leaders are needed to help create a shared vision of how the OSINT will be managed. 
Furthermore, both the leaders and the knowledge workers must develop a mutual 
conviction that knowledge management is the proper way to conduct OSINT. They must 
believe that it is worth their effort. To do so, well-founded, specific, relevant and realistic 
examples must be created to present the new knowledge-management opportunities to 
both the management and knowledge workers. That does not necessarily mean that the 
VZS must create such examples by itself first; many good examples of efficient open-
source knowledge management can certainly be found in the business world and in 
academia, too.  
 
Knowledge Mapping: Knowledge maps and similar surveys must first and 
foremost provide the understanding of the OSINT knowledge state. Such maps will 
describe major OSINT-related knowledge assets, activities, and practices, and will 
compare them to existing assets outside the VZS. Existing knowledge assets must be 
carefully mapped and collated with the directions and tasks assigned to the military 
intelligence. The VZS management needs OSINT knowledge mapping to establish the 
groundwork for a knowledge strategy and to identify specific needs and opportunities.  
Owing to limited budgets and other restrictions, the VZS may not want to hire an 
external survey team to map the knowledge inside the organization. So, the VZS should 
build one or a few dedicated teams by itself to survey quickly and economically the 
existing open-source knowledge and to create OSINT knowledge maps. These maps will 
help propose actions the VZS management and knowledge workers must take, and the 
maps will also help define key OSINT requirements. 
 
Knowledge Strategy: The VZS is an organization large enough to need a formally 
formulated OSINT strategy. A knowledge strategy is needed to determine how OSINT 
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will support the overall knowledge management, to set knowledge management 
priorities, and to determine key knowledge requirements, i.e. critical success factors 
(CSFs). The purpose of the strategy is to outline OSINT objectives by reflecting the 
knowledge management vision in a consistent framework. An explicit strategy will help 
OSINT managers and knowledge workers create and select specific solutions fitted to 
current and future conditions inside and outside the VZS. The strategy can improve 
decision-making by establishing a consensus around long-term goals, and by creating 
a vision for the OSINT knowledge workers. A strategic plan for OSINT should comprise 
at least the following elements: 
• OSINT vision;  
• List of the goals with regards to OSINT;  
• Forecast of developments in the external environment to which the VZS must 
respond; 
• Statement about how the VZS will extend its current OSINT system in the 
future; 
• Actions and milestones regarding decisions and projects, including milestones 
and financial projections. 
 
Key Knowledge Acquisition: Key knowledge must be acquired to fulfill the 
requirements of the CSFs. Here the focus is to obtain and to characterize the detailed 
open-source knowledge that will meet the CSFs demands. This can be done by gaining 
information from various open sources that will describe the actual knowledge in 
sufficient details for communication to other people and knowledge repositories. Using 
previously generated knowledge maps, knowledge workers can acquire the desired 
knowledge from individuals inside the VZS. Especially when employees are promoted or 
when they leave the organization, others should capture their valuable knowledge for 
reuse. Lessons learned, training, apprenticeship, and many other knowledge engineering 
methods are available to elicit extant knowledge. Furthermore, when sources of 
knowledge are outside the VZS—which, considering the nature of OSINT, will be the 
most frequent case—that knowledge must be gained for incorporation to the VZS 
knowledge assets.   
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Knowledge Transfer: Once the key knowledge has been obtained, it must be 
transferred to its users. Information technology (IT) itself does not manage knowledge, 
but it can greatly help the knowledge management process. It is important that the 
military management does not perceive knowledge management as just another database 
or a software program. These are just tools that support knowledge content. No system 
does it all; hundreds of products have different supporting functions, such as information 
search and retrieval, categorization, knowledge formalization, and distribution. The IT 
support personnel do not choose or create knowledge and its content. But they have the 
difficult task to select carefully commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products that will 
support knowledge management well. The VZS must build a comprehensive knowledge 
transfer system by creating an expert OSINT network, consisting of experts online, expert 
software systems, intelligent software agents, and so on. Usually, the extant knowledge 
transfer systems follow traditional paths and are uncoordinated. Also, some parts of the 
expert network may be missing in the existing organizational structure and procedures, 
owing to limited budgets and deficient incentives. It is likely that such inefficiencies will 
be discovered during the process of knowledge mapping; so in this stage, the builders of 
the expert OSINT network must address them. Detail studies of commercially available 
IT tools will be necessary prior to selecting COTS hardware and software, as well as 
training programs for those who will use them. Following this, the expert OSINT 
network will serve its purpose—to make the knowledge possessed by individuals 
available for distribution to the VZS employees and customers. 
 
Incentive Programs: VZS managers should motivate OSINT personnel to act 
intelligently—to be innovative, to capture new knowledge, to share their knowledge, and 
so on. Soon after the VZS management decides on a vision for OSINT, and after 
knowledge mapping indicates any needs for incentives or for removal of disincentives, 
the OSINT leaders can construct incentive programs in order to make OSINT knowledge 
workers personally responsible for knowledge mindfulness. The VZS management 
should know which factors influence behavior of OSINT personnel both positively and 
negatively and discuss these factors personally throughout the organization. Such factors 
may be associated with insufficient time or manpower, with people's self esteem, values 
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and emotions, with job security and social support, and so on. Because of the complexity 
and importance of such factors, the incentive programs must be continuous and flexible. 
 
Knowledge Assets Facilitation: Knowledge assets, both tacit and explicit, must be 
carefully managed through all six phases of the knowledge management life cycle, using 
extant IT tools. A proper distinction between knowledge assets that are owned by the 
VZS and those existing outside the organization, together with balanced investments for 
these two asset categories, can help build and exploit knowledge assets, provide essential 
support, and steer the desired OSINT activities. When building or improving the expert 
OSINT network, all the important knowledge "pathways" must be addressed. Ideally, the 
OSINT system will provide functions for all the KMLC phases—not only for knowledge 
organization, formalization, and distribution, but also for knowledge creation, 
application, and evolution. Moreover, the network must allow consistent knowledge asset 
management at every level of the VZS. 
 
 
B. OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS TO BUILDING OSINT 
KNOWLEDGE-MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
This section synthesizes the objectives of the OSINT knowledge management 
process and system design and the major limitations that are likely to occur during the 
design process. After presenting the core issues of the knowledge management process, 
the key points of the organizational design are compiled. In addition to that, the section 
also pinpoints three challenges specific to the Czech military intelligence. 
 
1. OSINT Knowledge Management Process 
 
Understanding the objectives and limitations of the knowledge management life 
cycle in the Czech military is a necessary condition for designing a future OSINT 
knowledge-management system. The core issues of knowledge creation, sharing, and 
distribution are as follows: 
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Knowledge Creation: Creating new knowledge does not come automatically. It is 
typically an act of establishing a meaningful relationship between concepts or objects that 
have not previously been related. It could happen by a fortunate accident, or it could be a 
result of an appropriate organizational environment that fosters creativity. Creativity also 
requires certain personal qualities, such as curiosity, imagination, assertiveness, self-
confidence, risk acceptance, and so on. The VZS certainly does not need castle-builders, 
but it may need visionaries and creative people. Intelligence personnel need to recognize 
when intelligence analysis may be no more sophisticated that existing "conventional 
wisdom" on a given issue, but they also need to recognize when "common sense" does 
not work properly and a non-conventional approach may help. 
Motivating creativity in OSINT is certainly challenging. The most important 
aspects are developing communication networks and also a culture with freedom of 
thought and enjoyment in the performance. These aspects have certain organizational 
implications for OSINT that are summarized as follows: 
• Organizational structure is flat, without hierarchical control, with task-
oriented teams; 
• Intelligence processes are directed toward generation, selection, and use of 
knowledge, with flexible planning and loose control; 
• Reward system allows autonomy of individuals and recognition of their 
abilities; 
• Knowledge workers elaborately combine technical knowledge with creative 
personal characteristics while managers act as sponsors and facilitators. 
(Galbraith and Kazanijan 1986) 
Some of the implication listed above, especially those going against traditional 
hierarchy, are hard to imagine and extremely difficult to promote in the military. Yet, 
these are desperately needed, if the Czech OSINT should reach its fully creative stage. 
Although it is unlikely that the military intelligence will reach ideal conditions for 
creativity, the VZS can certainly adopt some of the above-mentioned aspects to its 
structure and processes. 
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Knowledge Sharing: No matter how good the OSINT system is, unless it is 
directly tied to visible organizational benefits, the implementation of a knowledge-
management system can result in negative attitudes, low returns on investments, and 
resistant behaviors of those who are supposed to use it. Many organizations started 
building IT systems for knowledge management before building the cultural and 
collaborative base for such systems. But the issues of collaboration are important. For 
example, when tasked to contribute with their knowledge, people often see the request as: 
• Extra work (they are not paid for it); 
• No benefit for them (they do not need to share); 
• No benefit for the organization (they are not sure who will use the shared 
knowledge); 
• Benefit for others but little value to them.  
It is no wonder that with such attitudes and beliefs people do not want to share, 
and therefore to give away what they know and what they have learned, sometimes at 
great expenses. In reality, one does not lose anything by sharing knowledge; personnel 
still retain what they know. But practically, knowledge sharing depends on how much 
people believe in and value themselves and the others. (Coleman 1999) 
Knowledge sharing must be encouraged by certain rewards. The VZS 
management should not be surprised that it will want to implement a new information 
system, and it may end up solving the compensation issues. Obviously, that purely 
financial motivation to share knowledge is severely limited under the extant fixed 
disbursement system of the Czech military; however, economic incentives are not 
impossible. Moreover, people also respond to motives other than financial, such as to 
high cultural and professional values shared throughout the organization. The assistance 
of human resource professionals may be useful in building knowledge infrastructure and 
IT support when the VZS managers want to overcome traditional procedures and 
believes, which often judge an individual's value only in terms of what and whom that 
person knows. The military intelligence will need to establish trust within its OSINT 
network, both inside and outside the organization, to be able to share knowledge. Such 
trust is tough to build—especially within and among the intelligence services, where 
secrecy, suspicions, and distrust have strong roots. However, OSINT is an arena where 
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one does not need to hide one's existence and interests; on the contrary, extended contacts 
and mutual trust are critical to knowledge sharing in OSINT. For these reasons, the 
OSINT leaders must build mutual trust, find common context, establish reasons for 
knowledge sharing, and provide the space to think and share.  
 
Knowledge Distribution: One should clearly distinguish between the 
dissemination of information and the dissemination of knowledge. Many technologies 
currently used by the VZS and other Czech military organizations only provide access to 
data or information alone. This would work assuming that the users could understand the 
presented data or information so well that they could easily convert it to knowledge or 
assuming that the users already had the knowledge to understand and use the data 
directly. But such assumptions are usually not valid, as probably no one can be 
knowledgeable in all subjects and also, intelligence personnel do not have the time to 
learn about a new subject in detail when they are usually tasked to answer specific 
questions. So, consultants and expert systems are frequently needed if the intelligence 
questions are to be answered correctly. 
 One way to answer questions out of one's expertise is to locate an 
appropriate specialist, simply by selecting someone from a list of experts or by finding 
people who posses the expertise. Another way is to use an expert system—often complex 
computer software, usually interconnected with other expert systems, containing the 
experts' decision-making knowledge and allowing the knowledge to be effectively 
distributed to users. The reader may know of medical, legal, and other expert systems 
being successfully implemented in the business world. Indeed, expert systems are not 
remedies for all the OSINT needs. Sometimes immature, expert systems are just as good 
as the people who created them, yet they are still behind any human specialist in terms of 
the ability to create, to share, and to use knowledge. However, expert systems can be an 




2. Organizational Design  
 
Many managers in the Czech military believe that redesigning a system is creating 
new organizational charts and regenerating the tables of personnel and materiel. Yet, 
defining the future OSINT structure is definitely more complex than that. Here are the 
key points of the organizational design that must be considered during the OSINT design 
process: 
 
Hierarchy in the Organizational Design: Complex organizations, such as the 
military, traditionally approach their needs for specialization, coordination, and 
cooperation by creating hierarchical structures. As Max Weber (1968) described decades 
ago, bureaucracies with their hierarchical structures, with coordination and control 
through rules and standard operating procedures, and with separation of jobs and people 
eliminate most of the natural human behavior—cooperation, innovation, personality, 
variation, and emotion. Contrary to these structures, often called mechanistic structures, 
an organization can adopt an organic form of its structure—a form that has less narrowly 
defined tasks, all-directional communication, widely dispersed knowledge, and people 
loyal to the organization and its goals, rather than to their immediate supervisor.  
In the military, seemingly, no alternatives to hierarchy exist. As long as there are 
benefits from division of labor and specialization, hierarchy is inevitable. But the 
important issue is how the hierarchy should be structured and how the different parts of it 
should be related to one another. As shown in the previous chapter, the VZS is currently 
identified with an administrative hierarchy, in which the members are organized along 
superior-subordinate lines. Problems occur when the bureaucratic system with its 
standard procedures and high level of specialization has to produce various outputs from 
various inputs, using poorly implemented IT in a changing environment. The intelligence 
process can be jeopardized when the flow of information up the hierarchy and the flow of 
decisions down the hierarchy are too slow. So, the VZS should reorganize its OSINT 
structure to increase responsiveness to external changes. Although different branches and 
sections of the VZS can reach open sources with certain degree of independence from 
other subsystems, loose bonds of OSINT elements, equipped with more sufficient means 
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for communication and coordination will certainly increase the effectiveness for the 
whole VZ. Several factors urge the OSINT to move "beyond bureaucracy": 
• The centralized, structured organization cannot readily adapt to change; to be 
responsive to external change, OSINT needs to be decentralized, with less 
specialization, and looser control. 
• The information revolution changed the conditions for efficiency. 
Administrative bureaucracy and information systems to control people, as 
well as highly specialized manual labor, are less needed. Now, computer-
integrated knowledge work and job flexibility are priorities. 
• Decision-making power is needed at the operational level and should be 
accompanied by curtailing top-level staffs. 
• To improve cross-functional cooperation, teamwork must be emphasized as 
the basis for organizing separate intelligence activities. 
 
Designing OSINT Elements: If the OSINT system requires some form of 
hierarchy of its subsystems and elements, it is important to decide how the individuals are 
to be formed into teams and units within the VZS. For example, the OSINT elements can 
be organized on the basis of common task where the employees and assets are grouped 
according to their principal roles—information collectors, intelligence processors, 
communication specialists, and so on. The VZS might also develop its OSINT structure 
along the OSINT process itself, having separate elements for OSINT planning and 
direction, collection, processing, and dissemination. Or the VZS can organize its OSINT 
personnel according to their final products, such as OSINT daily monitoring awareness 
summary, all-source daily intelligence briefing, or monthly intelligence summary. 
Finally, OSINT elements can be grouped along their actual geographical location—or 
along the geographical location they pay attention to, such as the Balkans, the Middle 
East, or Russia. To decide properly, the military intelligence leaders must first understand 
the benefits and disadvantages of organizing the OSINT elements on one basis compared 
to an alternative basis, and then, when possible, combine the best of all the systems to 
design the organizational structure and management system of the future OSINT. 
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A critical design issue is the optimal degree of job specialization. Increased specialization 
certainly increases efficiency, but it also increases the need for coordination.  
For example, the VZS can organize its OSINT knowledge workers into small 
cells—OSINT units. These units can consist of one or a few people according to the 
desired specialization, geographical location, and so on. Instead of a highly top-down 
controlling structure, the OSINT units can be organized rather loosely. Knowledge 
workers can then cooperate more easily both inside the OSINT unit and with other units 
through information networks and other IT tools. A rather loose organization structure of 
OSINT units is expressed in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Loose Organization of OSINT Units 
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Coordination and Control: Coordination is vital to the organization's 
performance. The VZ specialists may be the best in the world—but unless they can 
coordinate their effort, their output is less than useful. Coordination in the VZ is not 
a technical issue; it is an issue of cooperation among different members of the 
organization who have different goals. Technology can just link those individuals and 
empower them to perform their tasks more efficiently.  Coordination is mainly about 
establishing the knowledge-management system and procedures than can permit OSINT 
specialists, i.e. knowledge workers, to relate to one another and to adjust their individual 
actions. Three different mechanisms are basically available for achieving goal alignment 
within the VZ: control mechanism, reward incentives, and shared values. 
 
Control Mechanisms typically consist of a manager supervising a group of 
subordinates. The manager monitors the subordinates' behavior and performance, and the 
subordinates are required to ask for approval when their actions are outside their 
reference. The incentives to comply with the existing hierarchy are both positive—
promotion up the hierarchical ladder, and negative—no promotion or dismissal. Control 
mechanisms are demanding in terms of several layers of supervisors that are needed to 
conduct the functions of monitoring and coercion. This mechanism would probably be 
efficient in situations where the knowledge workers would systematically use extant 
knowledge to produce standard output—similarly to workers in a production line. It is 
doubtful that such a situation would be the usual knowledge work in the VZS. 
Reward Incentives involve rewarding one’s actual performance. Such incentives 
directly link rewards to output, which is highly desired. Moreover, this mechanism 
significantly reduces the need for a costly management structure. However, this may be 
challenging in terms of performance measurements. Military intelligence specialists 
should not be rewarded according to the number of pages they produce on intelligence; 
they also should not be rewarded for how many hours they spent at work. The VZS 
employees do not work on machines producing nuts and bolts; they are supposed to 
create and use knowledge. Regular, even real-time adjustments and feedback to 
knowledge workers would help them take full responsibility for their work, without the 
necessity for supervisors. The key to promoting effective cooperation is to have more 
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sophisticated incentives than just the threat of dismissal or of losing a promotion. 
Obviously, establishing accurate performance measurements—so that a person can be 
rewarded for his or her actual knowledge performance— requires profound studies by 
experts. 
Shared Values can be rewarding by themselves when the organization’s goals are 
conflict free. Then, the VZ can achieve high levels of cooperation without extensive 
control mechanisms and without performance-related rewards. Unfortunately, the 
organization's goals are generally not conflict free, and such a mechanism is effective 
only in small teams that consist of highly devoted members of the intelligence 
community. Yet, this type of mechanism should not be forgotten because individuals who 
are driven more by their moral and ethical values than by their pay do exist and are often 
superior employees. Professional intelligence culture, comprising of positive beliefs, 
values, and behavioral norms can certainly influence how the VZ employees think and 
behave. Indeed, organizational culture takes a long time to develop and cannot be 
changed easily. However, open-source environment does not need to be wrapped up in 
mysteries and secret intelligence games, thus the organizational culture can serve as 
a unifying factor for cross-functional OSINT teams. 
 
One way or another, the future OSINT structure in the Czech military should 
provide for both a team-based and a project-based network of open-source experts, who 
will be available both inside and outside the VZ. Such a network can be flexible and 
responsive to various OSINT tasks, if the VZ focuses on coordination rather than on 
control. The OSINT knowledge-management system must permit knowledge to flow 
both vertically and horizontally. A well-balanced combination of the possibilities 







3. Challenges Specific to the Czech Military Intelligence 
 
Common challenges for knowledge management and OSINT have already been 
mentioned throughout the thesis. But the Czech governmental intelligence services, such 
as the VZ, also have to face other specific challenges. 
 
First, the VZ must strictly obey the laws and regulations related to vetting of its 
personnel and to handling classified documents. In author’s opinion the Czech Republic's 
laws and regulations in this area exceed any practical needs while often creating serious 
problems for individuals and organizations that must meet these formal requirements. 
Also, the "secrecy games" often limit, if not prevent, sharing of information and 
knowledge and additionally narrow the amount of people who can participate in the 
organizational knowledge sharing and decision-making processes. In scientific work, 
secrecy hinders the advancements of knowledge; in military strategy and tactics, secrecy 
can prevent careful planning and implementation of projects. Secrecy also obstructs 
reasoning, limits the perception of the problem, and limits alternatives to solving the 
problem, thus restricting choices and decisions (Bok 1983). Fortunately, OSINT need not 
be encumbered with such restrictions. The military personnel dealing with OSINT may 
certainly be the same people who deal with secrets. It just takes a specific mindset, as 
well as training and practice, to distinguish properly between unclassified and classified 
information when necessary and to amalgamate the two when needed. 
 
Second, information attained by the intelligence service is usually stored for 
a long period of time in order to provide for long-term analysis. However, the amount of 
information accessible from the open sources largely exceeds the amount collected 
covertly. Moreover, the dynamic nature of open sources does not support simple storage 
of data or information gained via OSINT, as they could easily become obsolete. So, 
rather than store everything in the OSINT cycle, OSINT collectors, analysts, and 
managers will have to carefully consider the relevancy of information and intelligence 
products and use the IT tools at their disposal cleverly. 
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Third, many documents must exist on paper. Although automated document 
processing is not a new concept, the VZ and other military organizations still require 
documents on paper, mostly signed by the top commanders and directors. (The higher, 
the better.) A secure electronic document exchange would speed routine daily work 
tremendously. Unfortunately, most military personnel still trust paper more than 
computers, although the paper is usually not a qualitatively higher form of information 
storage and bears many limitations that electronic systems do not have. Currently, with 
increasing concerns about information security (INFOSEC),19 the Czech military tends to 
be quite cautious about using computers and information networks. However, the Czech 
military can ensure necessary data integrity and availability through the smart use of 
modern technology for INFOSEC, such as the virtual private network (VPN), the Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL), and many other techniques.20 Indeed, collaborative computing may 




C. OSINT KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT PROCESS AND SYSTEM 
DESIGN 
 
This section presents an alternative model of the future OSINT knowledge-
management system of the Czech military. First, the section discusses the use of IT in 
general, and four main IT tools that should be employed in the Czech military OSINT—
intelligent agents, knowledge repositories, groupware, and expert systems. Then, 
a general model of the OSINT knowledge-management system is designed. 
 
                                                 
19 Generally, INFOSEC covers everything that is related to information systems security—
personnel security, physical security, operations security (OPSEC), communication security (COMSEC), 
computer security (COMPUSEC), emissions security, and so on. INFOSEC issues for OSINT represent a 
field for a separate specialized study. 
20 Data secrecy, data integrity, and data availability are three objectives of information security 
(INFOSEC). Data secrecy is of no concern in OSINT. However, data integrity, i.e. prevention of 
unauthorized modification and assurance of data accuracy, as well as data availability, i.e. timely response 
of the system, are important parts of the OSINT knowledge management system design. 
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1. Facilitating Knowledge Flow 
 
Military intelligence analysts, as well as decision-makers, can frequently answer 
their own questions using open sources. To do this effectively, they need IT tools that 
will allow them to find the desired knowledge, as well as to store and to share the 
knowledge they already posses. As stressed before, the Czech military must adapt to 
changes and requirements of the outside environment, partially by improving IT. Today's 
information technology allows one to capture and to store OSINT knowledge and to 
disseminate it throughout the organization. The Czech military must take advantage of 
extant IT to codify tacit knowledge, store it, and make it accessible to others.   
 
The future IT infrastructure of the VZS should provide as much functionality as 
possible. Here are just a few examples of what the IT infrastructure can provide to 
support the OSINT knowledge-management system (Wiig 1999, Nissen et al 2000): 
• Information gathering and information exchange through E-mail, intranet, 
Internet/WWW; 
• Internet/intranet data/information gathering through intelligent agents 
("bots"); 
• Collaboration through groupware; 
• Knowledge maps and knowledge "yellow pages" on intranets; 
• Access to knowledge base systems/expert systems; 
• Automatic pattern matching and inference from databases; 
• Knowledge creation tools for discovery in databases; 
• Knowledge organization and formalization tools; 
• Global knowledge distribution and sharing; 
• Office automation and management functions; 
• Distance learning.  
 
In the following, four main IT tools that should be incorporated in the future 
OSINT system in the Czech military are discussed. 
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Intelligent Agents: Intelligent agents are computer programs that can 
autonomously perform some human-like tasks and act on behalf of their users. These 
agents mostly integrate, analyze, evaluate, and interpret collected raw data; so they do not 
perform any knowledge-management functions, but they are certainly useful by 
automating the data processing and exploitation. Most readers have probably already 
used intelligence agents, in one form or another, when searching for information on the 
Web. Obviously, intelligent agents can be employed in various areas of the military 
intelligence functions. For example, they can be used to interact with an OSINT 
knowledge base, to determine how the given task can be fulfilled effectively, and to 
perform the necessary actions to reach the desired goal. Intelligent agents, connected with 
sensors on reconnaissance assets and performing automated tasks, can serve as other 
examples. Either way, the possible employment of intelligent agents should be carefully 
studied in order to decide about their applicability to the Czech military OSINT. 
 
Knowledge Repositories: Knowledge repositories can capture and formalize 
knowledge in its explicit form for further use throughout the VZS. Two basic types of 
knowledge repositories are 
External knowledge, which refers to knowledge about entities outside the VZS; 
Internal knowledge, which could be either structured, in a form of intelligence 
summaries, intelligence manuals, and so on, or informal, e.g. discussion forums, lessons 
learned, and so on. (Davenport et al 1998) 
As explained in the previous chapter, the military intelligence deals with all forms 
of knowledge—tacit and explicit, external and internal. So, knowledge repositories can 
certainly be used in the future OSINT system in order to provide basic platform for 
transferring the tacit open-source knowledge from individuals into a knowledge 
repository. The VZS should employ a nation-wide electronic discussion system as a part 
of its knowledge repository, through which it will be able to access experts outside the 
organization. The VZS should also build electronic OSINT knowledge repositories to 
perfect the knowledge transfer and knowledge internalization processes. The OSINT 
knowledge repositories must be made available through electronic networks to the 
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military units, especially when they are deployed in the military operation during a crisis 
or in humanitarian relief. 
 
Groupware: Groupware techniques allow individuals to communicate and 
collaborate with high efficiency by providing rich content and interactivity through real-
time presentations, electronic boards, discussion forums, and video conferencing. This 
overcomes problems with dispersion of the military personnel in time and space and also 
avoids some of the negative aspects related to turnover of personnel and lack of face-to-
face communication. Groupware can significantly help OSINT personnel participate 
remotely in the intelligence cycle processes. Moreover, groupware helps orient 
newcomers, familiarize them with procedures within and outside the intelligence 
community, and supports transitions of the organizational practices from one person to 
another (Davenport et al 1998). While such knowledge is relatively easy to capture and 
store, it will be difficult to find and to use without proper indexing and searching tools 
(Oxendine and Nissen 2001). The VZS should utilize COTS groupware, such as Lotus 
Notes, to facilitate the capture and the exchange of tacit knowledge. Moreover, the use of 
groupware must be accompanied with proper incentives for the VZS employees, as well 
as for the people outside the organization to contribute and to share OSINT knowledge. 
 
Expert Systems: Expert systems (ES) are computer programs that help non-experts 
make decisions similar to those of experts through an emulated interaction with a specific 
expert domain, such as finance, history, electronics, law, medicine, and so on. When 
communicating with the ES, users usually have no or limited knowledge about the 
subject but the ES supplies a part of an expert's decision-making knowledge through 
knowledge capture, storage, and dissemination. An expert system basically consists of 
a knowledge base and a capability to inference, which is provided by "interactive" 
communication between a user and the ES. By asking questions, making 
recommendations, following the Yes/No decision trees, and so on, the ES can play an 
important role in the OSINT knowledge-management system. 
The Czech military should use outside expert systems intensively, as well as 
create a military intelligence expert system on its own. Especially in the times of crisis, or 
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when the troops are deployed far from the direct intelligence support of the VZ, finding 
a specialist and communicating face-to-face can be hard to arrange. ES can assist 
commanders and staffs in the field to evaluate and interpret open-source information, 
help them recognize threats and trends, and support commanders' decisions. 
Indeed, creating an OSINT expert system is not a trivial task. First, the VZS must 
capture and formalize the necessary OSINT knowledge to create a knowledge base. This 
part is many times the Achilles' heel, for the ES developers must choose a proper set of 
knowledge-engineering tools and techniques and also knowledge workers must carefully 
fill the knowledge base with data—which is difficult and time consuming. Then, when 
the knowledge base is ready and the expert system is operational, future refinements are 
likely as the ES further develops. The expert system can serve, in the long-term, as an 
overlay interacting with the knowledge repositories that will be created in the short-term, 
looking for the relevant knowledge, and using it as a part of the ES decision support 
process (Oxendine 2000). 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the incorporation of IT tools, and the way the IT 
infrastructure can help facilitate knowledge flow in the OSINT system. One should not 
perceive the four IT means outlined above as "either-or" options. All the means are 
applicable to the OSINT knowledge-management system in the Czech military—but the 






Figure 12. OSINT Knowledge Flow and IT infrastructure 
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2. Organization of the OSINT Knowledge-Management System 
 
Jansen's contingency model, introduced in Chapter III, helped define the current 
organizational design of the VZS as a mixture of two types—division into business 
functions, and division into domains. The extant organizational design and IT does not 
reflect the characteristics of the modern open-source environment, which is perceived as 
highly complex and highly variable. In such an environment, the knowledge of each 
element of the organization is no longer sufficient to manage this knowledge. In order to 
manage this knowledge, the VZS should organize its OSINT structure to allow 
interpreting implicit knowledge, as well as to link old knowledge with new knowledge, 
thus creating new knowledge again. This is called combined capacity (Jansen et al 2000). 
The VZS should build mechanisms, such as knowledge repositories and groupware, to 
bond the compiled knowledge and to provide for its distribution and reuse. 
Building upon the Jansen's contingency model, one can see that the VZS 
organizational design should migrate toward creation knowledge through increased 
combined capacity of OSINT units, as depicted in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Four Strategies for Knowledge Management and the Future VZS 
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The increase of combined capacity is the only way to create new knowledge out 
of existent knowledge (Jansen et al 2000). If the military intelligence wants to maximize 
the combined capacity in OSINT, it must explore new forms of work, minimize rules and 
procedures for OSINT, and allow the highest possible degree of freedom for OSINT 
knowledge workers. 
The new organizational design of the VZS and its information and 
communication technology should reflect the characteristics summarized in Table 2. 
 
Organizational Type Organizational Design IT and Communication 
Increase of Combined 
Capacity 
• Organizing in Projects 
• Little Control, Much 
Freedom 
• Virtual Organizational 
Structure 
• Informal System Focused on 
Knowledge Creation 
• Intranet/Internet, Intelligent 
Agents/Search Engines, 
Groupware, Expert Systems 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of the Future Organizational Design and IT in the VZS 
 
 
The new OSINT knowledge management system does not need to dispose of old 
practices—as long as the practices sustain continuous reexamination and prove to be the 
best practices. Similarly, not everything that is newly created represents a better 
alternative to the knowledge already existing. Hence the VZS should build its OSINT 
knowledge-management system to balances efficiency—by propagating and 
disseminating extant knowledge—and flexibility— by creating and renewing knowledge. 
 
Virtual OSINT Organization: As mentioned in the previous chapter, the current 
organizational structure resembles a traditional vertically oriented control with 
accentuated bottom-up knowledge flow while the daily life requires the VZS personnel to 
collaborate in the horizontal direction. OSINT—in comparison with other "INTs"—is 
much less limited than typical secret intelligence activities; OSINT managers can 
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certainly be pioneers in exploring new controlling strategies and in creating a modern 
OSINT structure.  
One way to "organize" OSINT is not to organize it at all—at least in the 
traditional meaning. A concept of a virtual OSINT organization is very broad and is 
probably more limited by the people's will to accept such a notion than by extant IT 
means. A virtual OSINT organization can be a network of independent elements—
OSINT units in the VZS, individuals and groups inside the Czech military, experts in 
academia, and so on—linked by IT to create, share, and distribute OSINT knowledge, as 
well as to share costs that are related to it. IT plays a central role in developing such 
virtual organization (Byrne 1993). A knowledge base in a virtual organization is widely 
distributed and this wide knowledge spread can enormously benefit all members of the 
virtual organization. The virtual model probably represents the highest flexibility in terms 
of timelines, responsiveness, and exploiting knowledge. Unlike the fixed organizational 
structure, such a broad virtual organization can easily modify its structure once the 
specific opportunity has been exploited or once the given task has been solved. Ideally, 
each element of the virtual OSINT "corporation" will cooperate in accordance with its 
core competencies. The partnership among the different elements will last as long as it is 
beneficial for the cooperating partners (Dees et al 1995). The whole structure will 
concurrently work on various issues through computer networks in real time.  
 
Figure 14 illustrates a simplified vision of the virtual nation-wide OSINT 
organization. The main emphasis of the virtual organization is to complement and share 
resources in order to increase effectiveness and to lower costs. For small organizations or 
for organizations with severely limited resources—such as the Czech military—the 
virtual concept enables OSINT knowledge workers to join other organizations and to 
work on a much larger scale. In its maximal variant, the military, the police, academic 
researchers, intelligence services, other governmental bodies, and so on can create 
a nation-wide OSINT corporation that will be highly competitive internationally. The 
VZS does not need to be a dominant element of such nation-wide OSINT network—but it 
can certainly be the leader and the core of the OSINT network in the Czech military. 
102 
 
Figure 14. Virtual OSINT Organization 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter summarizes the main points of the previous chapters. The first 
section of this chapter stresses the significance of system approach and summarizes the 
main steps that the VZS management should take. The second section underlines the 
multifunctional and cross-organizational nature of OSINT and the importance of a virtual 




A. SIGNIFICANCE OF SYSTEM APPROACH 
 
Intelligence agencies are traditionally very conservative organizations. The 
Military Intelligence Service (VZS) management, as well as some of the knowledge 
workers may perceive changes to OSINT as a threat to the VZS and/or to themselves. 
Yet, improvements in the OSINT gathering and processing are not a threat to 
intelligence— reforms can ensure that a modern future for the Czech military intelligence 
exists. The Czech military intelligence should welcome all the advantages of modern 
open-source environment, which plays a highly important role in today’s intelligence.  
Today, as many individual organizations perform distinct intelligence tasks 
supporting an overlapping set of customers, deciding what an intelligence agency needs 
to collect is becoming more complicated. This is particularly true with OSINT, which is 
also influenced by the fact that Czech intelligence services now compete for resources. 
When using OSINT effectively, the military intelligence can respond to diverse crises 
efficiently and can also better allocate its severely limited resources into other areas of 
intelligence collection, when expensive covert means are unavoidable.  
 
If the VZS wants to improve its OSINT, a systematic approach to the open-source 
domain is needed. As shown in this thesis, the VZS can design a modern OSINT for the 
Czech military by adopting knowledge management theory. The key point is that those 
who will devise the future OSINT knowledge-management system should systematically 
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follow the four stages of the knowledge system and process design—process analysis, 
knowledge analysis, contextual analysis, and systems analysis and integration. 
Systematically applying the knowledge system and process design will help achieve the 
objectives and strategies of the VZS, and pinpoint the knowledge required so that the 
organization can reach its objectives.  
One must realize that the knowledge management system must be designed after 
the nature of knowledge itself is analyzed. Then, the knowledge within the VZS can be 
identified, captured, organized, formalized, and distributed throughout the organization. 
The VZS must develop knowledge maps to identify who possesses what kind of 
knowledge, both inside and outside its organizational structure. Moreover, the VZS must 
carefully survey its organizational design, focusing on controlling strategies and the 
information-flow configurations. Finally, the OSINT knowledge management designers 
must study each of the six phases of the knowledge management life cycle (KMLC) in 
terms of extant procedures and practices within the organization.  
The VZS should gradually build a comprehensive knowledge management system 
by creating a virtual OSINT network, consisting of experts online, expert software 
systems, intelligent software agents, and so on, to make open-source knowledge available 
to the VZS employees and customers. Future OSINT network must support creativity, 
content-rich communication, and effective knowledge sharing.  
A systematic approach will certainly require much effort and time, but the VZS 
will not be able to manage OSINT knowledge properly without this effort and without 
a long-term commitment. The systematic approach will identify existing open-source 
knowledge and capture it. It will also help find possible overlaps or inefficiencies in the 
existing or future OSINT knowledge-management system. This approach presupposes 
not only comprehensive knowledge about an adversary but also the ability to update this 
knowledge continually so that the military intelligence can react quickly to a changing 
situation. We have to move toward “situational awareness,” which will depend on 
advanced information processing technologies, such as artificial intelligence, in order to 
fuse large quantities of open-source information into an accurate, real-time intelligence. 
Hence, OSINT must serve as a wide base for the other intelligence disciplines. 
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It must not be forgotten that the entire knowledge management effort will just be 
rhetoric without a management commitment. Knowledge management champions among 
the top leaders must envision how the OSINT will be managed, pursue the vision, and 
share it with others. OSINT managers and knowledge workers must believe that 
a modern knowledge-management system is the proper way to conduct OSINT, and that 
it is worth their effort. Such conviction is not implied—people must create it. 
 
 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 
 
Every intelligence organization should serve not only the highest levels of 
government but also the subordinate levels, where actions are taken on a day-to-day 
basis. Several intelligence studies, made by research organizations and governmental 
bodies (e.g. Gannon 2000/1, IC21 2000, Nissen 2001), showed that a major key to 
improving the intelligence community in the information age is the concept of 
"corporateness.” That means, the VZS should function and behave as a part of a more 
closely integrated entity working toward a highly defined goal: the delivery of timely 
intelligence to various military and civilian decision makers. 
The Czech intelligence community needs to manage knowledge smarter, finding 
new ways to do more with less.  Rapid technological advances in knowledge 
management may offer new possibilities and advantages. The intelligence community 
should not ignore these advances—just as terrorists, proliferators, smugglers, information 
warriors, and other potential adversaries capitalize on such advances. 
Owing to the information explosion, single analysts and analyst cells are not able 
to process all the available open-source information anymore. A robust OSINT 
knowledge-management system can save much time and resources, reducing unnecessary 
intelligence requests. The VZS must find ways to create and to maintain a virtual network 
of information sources, collectors, exploiters, analysts and customers, as appropriate, and 
maximize the productivity and responsiveness of individual analysts. The future OSINT 
organization should effectively and economically share resources. 
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OSINT is an intelligence discipline that allows the VZS to become a virtual, 
project-oriented enterprise.  The VZS can adopt an organic, as opposed to a mechanistic 
structure—a form that does not have closely defined tasks. A rather loose organizational 
structure that emphasizes teamwork, all-directional communication, and widely dispersed 
knowledge can provide a desired environment for the future OSINT knowledge workers.  
The VZS should not struggle to divide the OSINT elements into strategic and 
tactic levels, trying to follow the traditional military hierarchy. Once the OSINT elements 
are connected through electronic networks, all organizational levels de facto disappear, 
and the OSINT units work as parts of one large virtual corporation. 
 
IT infrastructure will play an important part in the future OSINT system. The 
future IT structure should guarantee automated electronic document storage, retrieval, 
and exchange. Internal knowledge must be stored in the electronic knowledge 
repositories, and these repositories must be available through electronic networks. 
Groupware technology must facilitate the capture and the exchange of knowledge. 
Intelligent agents should be used to interact with open-source databases. A nation-wide 
electronic discussion system should provide access to experts outside the military. In the 
long term, the VZS should create a military intelligence expert system, which will be 




C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
This thesis establishes a base for the Czech military to employ modern 
knowledge-management theory and to build a future OSINT system. Further research and 
internal analyses are necessary to design the OSINT knowledge-management system. 
Moreover, as the knowledge process and system design is applicable to other intelligence 
disciplines as well, the VZS may want to analyze the other "INTs" in similar manner as 
the OSINT system. 
 
107 
First, the VZS may need a comprehensive study of its own tasks and capabilities 
to identify what knowledge is vital in order to assess performance in the VZS. After the 
study, each of the critical success factors (CSFs) should be evaluated as a single-target 
process. Then, the existing OSINT system must be evaluated in terms of process 
pathologies to determine how well the existing process meets the desired goals. Such 
a diagnosis will help eliminate the pathologies from the process. Also, the VZS should 
study how its employees utilize different methods of communication; here the assistance 
of human-resource professionals may be particularly useful. 
Once the designers analyze each process in the extant OSINT system and design 
the future knowledge-management process, the VZS must reconsider its IT infrastructure. 
IT specialists must conduct thorough studies of commercially available IT tools and then 
select appropriate COTS hardware and software. The VZS should consider using 
intelligent agents and determine their applicability to the Czech military OSINT. All of 
this is certainly a complex task—random and rushed implementations of "IT solutions" 
into existing processes cannot work in both the civilian and military organizations. 
Finally, the VZS must determine the future organizational structure of OSINT 
elements—yes, this is the last step, not the first one. The OSINT system designers must 
recognize the benefits and disadvantages of different bases, and then combine the best of 
all the alternatives to create the future organizational structure of the OSINT knowledge-
management system. 
 
Closing Thought: People, not machines, are the key element of the intelligence 
community.  All of the collection capabilities would be meaningless without dedicated 
and well-educated people who know how to manage knowledge and how to use modern 
IT tools. The knowledge of many experts in the intelligence community who claim to 
know something about computers, software, and technology in general is still low. Few 
military employees have the insight to recognize adequate and inadequate computer 
technology. Although many employees have become more “tech-savvy” during the last 
ten years, continuous education and training is needed to move ahead, toward the world 
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